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| 1 |
ID:
128583
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| 2 |
ID:
038625
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| Publication |
Berkeley, University of California Press, 1988.
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| Description |
552p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
0520066677
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 030876 | 923.15691/SEA 030876 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
137376
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars have detailed the American “tilt” toward Iraq during the 1980s. There is, however, an important pre-history to this relationship, which has only emerged with the release of new American and Iraqi documents. American overtures to Saddam Hussein originated not under Reagan, but under his predecessor. From early in his presidency, Jimmy Carter sought to engage Iraq in hopes of moderating the Baathist regime and fortifying America’s position in the Persian Gulf and broader Middle East. Though this diplomacy ultimately proved unsuccessful, this episode has implications for the study of Carter’s foreign policy and the evolution of American–Iraqi relations.
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| 4 |
ID:
162827
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This article explains the Carter administration’s retreat from supporting self-determination as a human right for Palestinians. It therefore moves beyond the focus by many scholars on the “heroic diplomacy” employed by Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat, and Menachem Begin leading up to and during the Camp David Summit, and instead examines Carter’s Arab-Israeli diplomacy in a broader international context that takes into account his larger policies towards the Palestinians and his emphasis on human rights in the conduct of American foreign relations. By looking beyond the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt – the agreement that led to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace treaty in 1979 and the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian sovereignty -- and focusing instead on Carter’s policy toward the Palestinians during his presidency, a more complex picture about Carter’s support for Palestinian self-determination begins to emerge that raises questions about his commitment to human rights abroad.
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| Contents |
This article explains the Carter administration’s retreat from supporting self-determination as a human right for Palestinians. It therefore moves beyond the focus by many scholars on the “heroic diplomacy” employed by Jimmy Carter, Anwar Sadat, and Menachem Begin leading up to and during the Camp David Summit, and instead examines Carter’s Arab-Israeli diplomacy in a broader international context that takes into account his larger policies towards the Palestinians and his emphasis on human rights in the conduct of American foreign relations. By looking beyond the Camp David agreement between Israel and Egypt – the agreement that led to the Egyptian-Israeli Peace treaty in 1979 and the return of the Sinai Peninsula to Egyptian sovereignty -- and focusing instead on Carter’s policy toward the Palestinians during his presidency, a more complex picture about Carter’s support for Palestinian self-determination begins to emerge that raises questions about his commitment to human rights abroad.
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| 5 |
ID:
134601
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After the 1973 Arab–Israeli war, the American Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, conducted a series of negotiations between Israel and its Arab adversaries, culminating in three disengagement agreements. As successful as these were, by late 1975 Kissinger’s step-by-step approach had stagnated. New approaches seemed essential to push the peace process forward. Throughout 1975, a Brookings Institution study group wrote a report on how the United States could better approach Arab–Israeli peacemaking. It recommended a comprehensive approach, aimed at solving all outstanding questions, by including all the parties within the same framework. The recommendations advocated including the Soviet Union in the peace process and that the Palestinians should represent themselves. The report was highly influential on President Jimmy Carter’s subsequent approach towards the Arab–Israeli conflict—and many of the report’s authors staffed his Administration. Carter’s perceived adaptation of the report aggrieved the Israelis, whilst for others the Brookings report served as a normative benchmark for the Carter presidency.
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| 6 |
ID:
123840
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2013.
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Before Representative Donald Fraser and the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Organizations and Social Movements held hearings in 1973 on human rights, the issue had garnered only episodic attention by governmental actors. The subcommittee's resulting report called for "U.S. leadership" on the international protection of human rights, and subsequent legislation implemented many of the subcommittee's recommendations. Taken together, the hearings and their consequences signaled a turning point in U.S. human rights policy as they influenced efforts to reshape the State Department's bureaucracy and formalized attention to human rights as a factor in U.S. policy in the years that followed. Importantly, this congressional activism pre-dated Jimmy Carter's administration and ensured attention to human rights would continue beyond his single term in the White House.
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| 7 |
ID:
093800
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2010.
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Barack Obama might yet revolutionize America's foreign policy. But if he can't reconcile his inner Thomas Jefferson with his inner Woodrow Wilson, the 44th president could end up like No.39
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| 8 |
ID:
186371
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Jimmy Carter is often accused of ‘losing Iran’. It may therefore come as a surprise that no American tried harder to forestall the Iranian Revolution than Carter. The increasing availability of archival evidence reveals that Carter tried to press Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, who was reluctant to act, to restore order. Carter even contemplated a military coup to prevent the assumption of power by revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. None of this worked, because America’s allies were too fickle and its adversaries too determined. Carter was ultimately guilty not of ‘losing’ Iran, but of misunderstanding it.
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| 9 |
ID:
139161
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The Iranian hostage crisis remains as one of the dominant memories from the presidency of Jimmy Carter. While scholars and journalists have devoted considerable attention to the administration's response to the crisis, no one has focused on the religious dimension of the hostage crisis. Drawing extensively on the archival records of the Jimmy Carter Presidential Library, this study argues that American and Iranian perceptions of the other's religion complicated a conflict already fraught with sacred symbolism. While the Iranians castigated Carter for insincerely professing his faith, the president's foreign policy advisors underestimated the role of religion in the new Iranian regime and how it might be used to bring the hostages home. The hostages finally came home when the United States negotiated with Iran's religious leaders and those leaders no longer had any political use for the hostages. Ultimately, this essay contributes to the relatively small literature analyzing the foreign relations of the Carter administration through a religious lens.
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| 10 |
ID:
156348
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This article provides a detailed review of Jimmy Carter’s policy toward South Korea and the reaction from South Korea in the late 1970s based on recently declassified South Korean and American archival documents, newspapers, an interview with a former South Korean official, and the biography of South Korean president Park Chunghee. Jimmy Carter had a difficult time realizing his pledge to withdraw American ground troops from South Korea because of opposition from the U.S. Congress and insubordination among U.S. Army officials. Otherwise, Seoul did not disagree with the U.S. president in an ostensible manner. However, newly found evidence indicates that the South Korean leadership encouraged the split between the U.S. executive and legislature, the U.S. Army’s resistance toward its president, and criticism from Japan, another important diplomatic partner of Washington. This article highlights how various groups opposing American troop withdrawals undermined the president’s rationale for removing forces from South Korea.
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| 11 |
ID:
122084
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2013.
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How do policymakers infer the long-term political intentions of their states' adversaries? A new approach to answering this question, the "selective attention thesis," posits that individual perceptual biases and organizational interests and practices influence which types of indicators a state's political leaders and its intelligence community regard as credible signals of an adversary's intentions. Policymakers often base their interpretations on their own theories, expectations, and needs, sometimes ignoring costly signals and paying more attention to information that, though less costly, is more vivid (i.e., personalized and emotionally involving). In contrast, intelligence organizations typically prioritize the collection and analysis of data on the adversary's military inventory. Over time, these organizations develop substantial knowledge on these material indicators that they then use to make predictions about an adversary's intentions. An examination of three cases based on 30,000 archival documents and intelligence reports shows strong support for the selective attention thesis and mixed support for two other approaches in international relations theory aimed at understanding how observers are likely to infer adversaries' political intentions: the behavior thesis and the capabilities thesis. The three cases are assessments by President Jimmy Carter and officials in his administration of Soviet intentions during the collapse of détente; assessments by President Ronald Reagan and administration officials of Soviet intentions during the end of the Cold War; and British assessments of Nazi Germany before World War II.
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| 12 |
ID:
104202
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| 13 |
ID:
154113
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| Summary/Abstract |
It appeared that as 1977 dawned, the political climate in the United States might render multi-billion dollar arms sales into unstable regions a thing of the past. Jimmy Carter triumphed in the presidential election of November 1976 on a popular platform of arms control and the introduction of human rights considerations into American foreign policy. His transition from that idealistic candidate to the president who agreed to sell Iran a fleet of highly advanced AWACS aircraft, as part of a record breaking $5.7 billion arms package, is therefore outwardly confusing. Yet, when examining the entrenched policy path that Carter inherited regarding arming Iran, and the larger needs of Cold War containment, the logic of Carter’s decisions essentially to betray his own policies in this case becomes clear.
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| 14 |
ID:
038689
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| Publication |
London, Collins, 1982.
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| Description |
xiv, 622p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
0002166488
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 026026 | 923.173/CAR 026026 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 15 |
ID:
090659
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The first part of this article will discuss the prepresidential origins of Carter's global worldview and how this shaped the administration's dealings with the Soviet Union and the PRC. The second part will focus on the reasons Carter was unwilling to allow continued recognition of the ROC. Ultimately, Carter's moralistic sensibilities and his desire to create a more stable world order formed the basis by which he decided to normalize relations with the PRC and to accept the political consequences of "abandoning" Taiwan.
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| 16 |
ID:
111567
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In May 1977, in a public forum, President Jimmy Carter laid out the foundations of a distinctive foreign policy programme for the United States. He offered a striking shift away from the Cold War realpolitik of previous American administrations. Human rights, he declared, would be a central component of United States foreign policy. The growing instability in Central America, especially in Nicaragua, during Carter's term of office provided a major test of his Administration's new programme. And its ultimate response to Nicaraguan instability thus provides key insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the thirty-ninth President's attempt to move beyond traditional, hard-line Cold War diplomacy.
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| 17 |
ID:
098401
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2010.
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The worst thing Washington could do is to operate on autopilot, to assume that past strategies and policies (which have generally served the United States well) are ipso facto indefinitely useful.
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| 18 |
ID:
085961
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2009.
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The charge that Israel's incursion into Gaza led to a "disproportionate" use of force against Palestinians, issued by the likes of former President Jimmy Carter and UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, met with surprising rhetorical resistance in unexpected quarters (on this continent, at least) in the first few weeks after Israel began its operation at the end of December. "Anyone who knows anything about the Middle East knows that proportionality is madness," wrote Richard Cohen of the Washington Post, who is better known as a critic than as a defender of Israel. "These calls for proportionality rankle. They fall on my ears not as genteel expressions of fairness, some ditsy Marquess of Queensbury idea of war, but as ugly sentiments pregnant with antipathy toward the only state in the Middle East that is a democracy."
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| 19 |
ID:
114262
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2012.
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The Arab-Israeli wars since 1948 resulted in several peace treaties between Israel and its neighbours brokered by the US, the Soviet Union and European countries in an attempt to achieve a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East. All efforts however proved ultimately futile, with the resumption of war several years after each peace treaty had been signed. For example, after the Six Day War of 1967, all parties agreed to accept a peace treaty based upon United Nations Resolution 242. However, six years after the tabling of the resolution, war broke out again on October 1973. Another long process of peace settlement ensued which culminated in the Camp David Accords, brokered by President Jimmy Carter. These peace accords, signed between President Anwar Sadat of Egypt and Menachem Begin of Israel on 17 September 1978, led directly to the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty of 1979. Despite its success, the 1979 treaty yet again failed to achieve the just and lasting peace settlement that had been expected. In all these treaties, the core issues of the conflict, such as the Palestinian refugee problem and the status of East Jerusalem, failed to be resolved. This article examines the British attitude and perspective towards the peace settlement after the 1973 war, focussing on the proposal for an International Peace Guarantee and the initiative of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. Based upon declassified archival records of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office available at the National Archives in England, it unveils the attitude of the British government towards the UN Resolutions as well as its collective initiatives with the European Community to establish a just and lasting peace settlement in the Middle East.
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| 20 |
ID:
128819
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