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| 1 |
ID:
083075
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Russian foreign policy reflects an evolving balance between vulnerability and opportunity. For much of President Putin's second term, Russia has been on the defensive. Despite increasing economic strength, observed in greater activity and an apparently more confident rhetorical stance, Russian diplomacy reflected a sense of vulnerability in Moscow. Indeed, diplomacy was largely inward looking: on the one hand it was a tool with which to unite and mobilize the Russian population rather than confront the West; on the other hand, it was a means of preventing external interference in Russian domestic affairs. On another level, Moscow sees an international situation destabilized by the unilateral actions of the US and an attempt by the 'western alliance' to assert and export its value system. But Moscow also believes that the international situation has reached a moment of transition, one which presents an opportunity for a Russia that lays claim to a global role. Russian foreign policy reflects a broad consensus in Moscow that asserts Russia's status as a leading power with legitimate interests. This moment of opportunity coincides with Moscow's desire to rethink the results of the post-Cold War period and to establish Russia as a valid international player. Continuing constraints and recognition that its domestic priorities proscribe Moscow from seeking confrontation with the West, which it cannot afford. Nonetheless, the attempt to establish the legitimacy of sovereign democracy as an international model of development appears to represent an important development in how Russia will approach wider European politics
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| 2 |
ID:
083078
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The British military have embarked on a comprehensive process of transformation towards a network-enabled, effects-orientated, and expeditionary force posture. This has involved developing brand new military doctrine, organizational concepts, and technology. The US military are also transforming, and American military ideas about network-centric and effects-based warfare have influenced the British military. But the British have not simply aped their US ally. Rather, British military transformation has followed a different path. Hence, this article proposes a dynamic model of military innovation involving two international drivers: new operational challenges and military emulation; and three national shapers: resource constraints, domestic politics and military culture. This model is then applied to a detailed empirical analysis of the process and progress of British military transformation
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| 3 |
ID:
083079
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article analyses the significance of the highly anticipated trial of Charles Taylor at The Hague which, after a false start in 2007, resumed in early January 2008. Starting with the historical background, the article assesses the major juris-prudential issues which are likely to be considered during the course of the trial and to fit the case within the broader context of other developments both within the Special Court of Sierra Leone and other international tribunals. The funding problems that have beset the court and issues such as the handling of witnesses are also considered. The final outcome of the trial is as yet uncertain but it may suggest ways forward in terms of bringing greater accountability into the field of international criminal law. Ultimately, both retributive and restorative justice must play their part in ending the impunity of war criminals, whatever their status in society
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| 4 |
ID:
083073
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article assesses the rise of President Ahmadinejad from the perspective of the Weberian concept of charismatic authority. It argues that in re-engaging with an authoritative structure founded on charisma, the hard line political establishment of the Islamic Republic have returned to a traditional form of autocratic power which is inherently unstable. The cycle of distress and enthusiasm from which it grows generates a momentum and ideological polarization which the leaders of the Islamic Republic may find increasingly difficult to escape
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| 5 |
ID:
083074
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Saudi Arabia, homeland of Osama bin Laden and 15 of the 19 hijackers of September 11, 2001, experienced low levels of internal violence until 2003, when a terrorist campaign by 'Al-Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula' (QAP) shook the world's leading oil producer. Based on primary sources and extensive fieldwork in the Kingdom, this article traces the history of the Saudi jihadist movement and explains the outbreak and failure of the QAP campaign. It argues that jihadism in Saudi Arabia differs from jihadism in the Arab republics in being driven primarily by extreme pan-Islamism and not socio-revolutionary ideology, and that this helps to explain its peculiar trajectory. The article identifies two subcurrents of Saudi jihadism, 'classical' and 'global', and demonstrates that Al-Qaeda's global jihadism enjoyed very little support until 1999, when a number of factors coincided to boost dramatically Al-Qaeda recruitment. The article argues that the violence in 2003 was not the result of structural political or economic strains inside the Kingdom, but rather organizational developments within Al-Qaeda, notably the strategic decision taken by bin Laden in early 2002 to open a new front in Saudi Arabia. The QAP campaign was made possible by the presence in 2002 of a critical mass of returnees from Afghanistan, a clever two-track strategy by Al-Qaeda, and systemic weaknesses in the Saudi security apparatus. The campaign failed because the militants, radicalized in Afghan camps, represented an alien element on the local Islamist scene and lacked popular support. The near-absence of violence in the Kingdom before 2003 was due to Al-Qaeda's weak infrastructure in the early 1990s and bin Laden's 1998 decision to suspend operations to preserve local networks. The Saudi regime is currently more stable and self-confident-and therefore less inclined to democratic reform-than it has been in many years
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| 6 |
ID:
083070
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) has come a long way in a relatively short space of time. From inauspicious beginnings, the principle was endorsed by the General Assembly in 2005 and unanimously reaffirmed by the Security Council in 2006 (Resolution 1674). However, the principle remains hotly contested primarily because of its association with humanitarian intervention and the pervasive belief that its principal aim is to create a pathway for the legitimization of unilateral military intervention. This article sets forth the argument that a deepening consensus on R2P is dependent on its dissociation from the politics of humanitarian intervention and suggests that one way of doing this is by abandoning the search for criteria for decision-making about the use of force, one of the centre pieces of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty 2001 report that coined the phrase R2P. Criteria were never likely to win international support, the article maintains, and were less likely to improve decision-making on how best to respond to major humanitarian crises. Nevertheless, R2P can make an important contribution to thinking about the problem of military intervention by mitigating potential 'moral hazards', overcoming the tendency of international actors to focus exclusively on military methods and giving impetus to efforts to operationalize protection in the field
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| 7 |
ID:
083071
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The US-led post 9/11 'intervention' in Afghanistan was, by definition, not a humanitarian intervention. The intervention in Afghanistan was defined as an act of self-defence by the US and it was one of the first steps in the 'war on terror' by the US and its allies: it had no intention or clear strategies for long-term stabilization, state-building or development. The US-led international coalition failed to 'find' Al-Qaeda in the short term and new arguments had to be made to justify continued international presence. The initial agenda was quickly blurred by a mismatch of intentions including those of long-term stabilization and state-building. The ideas developed through the Bonn Agreement (2001-5) and continued through the Afghanistan Compact (2006-10) have focused on building a centrally governed state (sometimes defined as democratic) that has a monopoly on the use of force. Their shortcomings are already well-documented: the urgency of the Bonn Conference and of the adoption of the Bonn Agreement ostensibly meant trading expediency and stability for accountability and a clean slate, which is not to say that there were no good intentions at Bonn from stakeholders, but that Afghans and the international community put power-sharing before progress. The choices made at Bonn may have contributed to the culture of impunity and the entrenched poverty that is gripping Afghanistan today. This article responds to the claims that state-building and all that goes with it are not the responsibility of the 'international community' by addressing the accountability and humanitarian paradoxes. The question remains, however, about who should be responsible for reform and politically accountable in the aftermath of non-humanitarian (and indeed even humanitarian) interventions?
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| 8 |
ID:
083076
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2008.
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In November 2007, the heads of the ten member governments of the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) signed a charter that will, once ratified, give the association a legal personality. The charter, significantly, requires more of its members than a reassertion of the traditional ASEAN norm of non-interference and the practice of consensus. The charter lists a number of novel goals among the organization's purposes: 'to strengthen democracy, enhance good governance and the rule of law, and to promote and protect human rights and fundamental freedoms.' In view of the wide economic and political disparities between the member states of ASEAN, this article examines whether strengthening democracy would in fact facilitate ASEAN's goal of becoming an integrated political, economic and security community. Rather than enhancing an integrated community, democratization would arguably create a faultline between the more politically mature and economically developed states and a northern tier of less developed, authoritarian single-party dominant regimes in South-East Asia. Moreover, given China's emerging political and economic importance to the region, such a strategy would, as if by an invisible hand, draw the more authoritarian ASEAN states into China's less than democratic embrace. This article concludes that rather than strengthening democracy, ASEAN's charter needs urgently to reinforce practices of rule governance and mechanisms of market integration to enhance both ASEAN's economic profile as well as the region's autonomy
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| 9 |
ID:
083077
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
How can negotiations be conducted to promote the legitimacy of international institutions such as the World Trade Organization (WTO)? Can negotiation procedures be designed so as to strengthen the WTO as an institution and the agreements it concludes? One reason for which the legitimacy of the organization is being questioned is its decision-making-especially negotiation-procedures. These have contributed significantly to recent setbacks in WTO talks. Yet proposals for procedural reform have not been subject to much discussion or review, in particular with no regard to content which may boost legitimacy. Justice and other values associated with legitimacy have generally not been addressed by trade experts, and conceptual tools for identifying what practical form their inclusion could take are lacking. This article reviews a variety of proposals, formal and informal, for reforming the WTO's negotiation procedures. It develops an approach to procedural justice which is used to identify the justice content in these proposals, based on four main principles. Drawing on this analysis, the article concludes by highlighting promising elements of reform. In so doing, it brings research literature on justice and negotiation to bear on current debates over the legitimacy deficit in international institutions, using the WTO as a significant case. More practically, the article helps to identify what more legitimate negotiation procedures may mean and require, and how their justice content may be assessed and increased
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| 10 |
ID:
083072
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Vienna negotiations on the final status for Kosovo were an impossible project. It was clear at the outset that both parties would not be able to find common ground on the status issue. However, the talks focused on the practical issues of governance in Kosovo, such as decentralization, community rights and cultural heritage. It was thought that these could be addressed, initially at least, in a status-neutral way. While the parties did not manage to agree on all or most of these problems, the UN Special Envoy, Martti Ahtisaari, generated a comprehensive proposal offering compromise solutions that should have been acceptable to both sides. The recommendation of the Special Envoy in favour of supervised independence was deliberately separated from the comprehensive proposal. It was thought that the UN Security Council would at least endorse the proposal, even if it was ultimately unwilling to pronounce itself in favour of independence. The issue of status might then be settled outside the Council. However, when it appeared to some states on the Council that endorsement of the substantive Ahtisaari plan would in fact be tantamount to acceptance of independence, this avenue was closed.
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