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ID:
127061
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2011, Australia communicated a clear choice about its strategic future. It would continue to cleave tightly to the US alliance, expand its military links and work to advance the USA's conception of regional order. Given its economic interests, why has Australia bound itself to the US alliance? What lies behind this strong commitment and what would it take for Australia to change its relationship with the USA? This article presents an analysis of the current state of the US-Australia alliance and argues that Canberra's pursuit of close relations with the USA reflects the interaction of a rational calculation of the costs and benefits of the alliance with a set of resolutely political factors that have produced the current policy setting. The article first assesses the security cost and benefit behind the alliance. It then argues that the move also derives from the strong domestic support for the US alliance, a sharpened sense that China's rise was generating regional instability that only the US primacy could manage and the realisation that the economic fallout of such a move would be minimal. It concludes with a brief reflection on what it might take to change the current policy settings.
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| 2 |
ID:
086133
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2009.
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Why has South Korea accommodated China, instead of fearing its growth and balancing against it? This article makes two central arguments. First, concepts of balancing and bandwagoning are fundamentally difficult to test, and to the extent that the theory can be tested, it appears to be wrong in the case of South Korea. In fact, we observe many cases in which rising powers are neither balanced nor "bandwagoned" but are simply accommodated with no fundamental change either way in military stance or alignment posture. Second, the factors that explain South Korean foreign policy orientation toward China are as much about interests as they are about material power. South Korea sees substantially more economic opportunity than military threat associated with China's rise; but even more importantly, South Korea evaluates China's goals as not directly threatening.
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| 3 |
ID:
137223
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South Korea and Japan have experienced their worst deterioration of bilateral relations since 2012. What are the long-term prospects for this relationship? Will it continue on this negative trajectory or recover positively in the long term? Challenging the conventional view that supports the former conclusion, this paper argues for a positive outlook for the relationship in the long term. This is defended from a structural perspective relying on two long-term strategic trends for Northeast/ East Asia—the elevated uncertainty in the regional environment (due to North Korea and China’s strategic rise); and the rising strain on the U.S. military presence in both countries. In response to these structural pressures, South Korea and Japan will adapt and adopt strategies to defend their national security within a reformed U.S. alliance structure and strengthen strategic cooperation through bilateral and trilateral (with the United States) means.
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| 4 |
ID:
131822
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2014.
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For more than half a century, three broad objectives have formed the core of a bipartisan foreign policy consensus in Australia: support for the US alliance, the development of closer relations with Asia, and integration with a rules-based international order. Until now, we have lived in a world in which Australian governments have found it easy enough to keep all three in alignment. But that is changing. Foreign policy which, in Australia, has traditionally taken second place as a way of thinking about the world to security and defence policy is becoming more important and more complicated.
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| 5 |
ID:
160482
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As an introduction to this special issue, this article examines the shaping of Japan’s foreign policy; looking at how Japan has risen to the demand of the international community to assume more responsibility in conflict situations, circumventing a pacifist constitution that it had been dealt with. It then explains relations between Middle East and Japan and shows how the latter has been balancing its national interest in order to conform to its alliance with the United States. With more Asian powers having stake in the Middle East, Japan has become proactive about its role in the region. However, with limited hard power options, Japan would have to concentrate on its soft power capabilities and on using its economic strength to mark its presence in the Middle East.
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| 6 |
ID:
189034
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Washington’s biggest concern in its relationship with South Korea has been returning to a stance consistent with active engagement in the Indo-Pacific region. In response to June 2020 remarks by a senior South Korean official that his country had the right to choose between the US and China, the US State Department commented that South Korea had already chosen the US several decades ago when it abandoned authoritarianism and embraced democracy.Footnote1 In October 2021, although Washington officially welcomed the declaration of an end to the Korean War—a proposal that had been promoted for several years by the Moon Jae-in administration—the Biden administration expressed de facto opposition by insisting that it be linked to tangible North Korean denuclearization measures.
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| 7 |
ID:
107159
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2011.
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This paper explains one of the central roles of alliance contracts, the prevention of undesirable military entanglement. The existing literature on alliances argues that entrapment is a major concern for potential and actual alliance partners, but it is difficult to point out clear cases of entrapment. I provide two answers to this puzzle: First, entrapment is a narrower concept than others have realized, and it is rarer than the literature suggests. Second, leaders anticipate entrapment and carefully design alliance agreements before and after states form alliances. I examine the second argument through case studies of us alliance agreements with South Korea, Japan, and Spain.
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