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ID:
151248
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| Summary/Abstract |
What do democracies do by refusing to trade with dictatorships? The conventional view assumes that: (1) a democratic refusal to trade with dictators is an exception that requires special justification; (2) following customary international law, dictators should normally be recognized as legitimate in selling their peoples' resources; (3) a refusal to trade is one policy option which democratic governments may choose; and (4) a refusal to trade succeeds only when contributing to change in the “target” country. Focusing on natural resource trade, I develop an alternative view which holds that: (1) democracies owe no special justification for refusing to trade; (2) dictators have no right to sell their peoples' natural resources; and (3) democratic refusal to purchase natural resources from dictators should be the norm. It follows that (4) such refusal achieves an important moral goal simply by preventing corporations based in democratic countries from partaking in crime.
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| 2 |
ID:
086149
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article applies E. H. Carr's analysis of utopia and reality, and a Searlean-constructivist analysis of rules and norms, to the concept of 'sovereignty' in general, and Stephen Krasner's argument in Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy in particular. In doing this, the article charts a theoretical space that incorporates insights from classical realism, scientific realism, and philosophical (social) constructivism. To view 'utopia' and 'reality' as distinct yet equally important planes of International Relations (IR) inquiry, thereby treating 'sovereignty' as a single concept with descriptive and normative elements, highlights both the merits and the shortcomings of Krasner's approach. Furthermore, this type of analysis suggests a fruitful way to continue a contemporary normative discussion about what sovereign entities ought to do.
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