| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2002-2003, the US pressed for and then used coercive force against Iraq and was ultimately supported by 16 of the 26 NATO member states, though not by NATO itself. While the US and Europe shared similar strategic threat perceptions - weapons of mass destruction proliferation, failed states and terrorism - but difference were apparent on the conceptual level. Here diverging political outlooks, differing comparative advantages, and capability bottlenecks all help account for different policy responses and priorities, particularly with regards to Iraq. The consequences and implications for European security and transatlantic relations of the Iraq war were more palpable than its causes: the rift fractured pre-existing transatlantic fault lines and consolidated realignments around concepts of 'Atlantic Europe', 'Core Europe', 'New Europe' and 'Non-aligned Europe'. The dynamic events before and after the US-led Iraq war of 2003 and the policy and identity, ideational, institutional and power shifts that underpinned them appear to lack the constructive potential to generate a push for 'strategic renewal' or the destructive power to enforce a total 'strategic divorce'. Strategic dissonance and continued turbulence has become the default transatlantic condition. The dynamics that generate its power still have the potential to resurface and further fragment and paralyse the unity of purpose and action of the transatlantic security community, as well as a constructive potential that can be harnessed.
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