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| 1 |
ID:
091376
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Private security companies' growing participation in U.S. and international military missions has raised concern about whether the private security industry is subject to sufficient controls. Industry self-regulation is often proposed as part of a multilayered framework of regulations to govern PSCs. But what can self-regulation contribute to regulation of the private security industry? This matters because privatization in the security realm has moved beyond understandings of the proper breakdown of public and private functions concerning the use of force. This article assesses what self-regulation can contribute to the control of this industry and whether the private security industry lends itself to effective self-regulation. It concludes that the private security industry does not exhibit the capacity to adopt and implement effective self-regulation on its own. If self-regulation is to complement state and international regulation, participation in the design and oversight of self-regulation must be broadened beyond private security companies alone.
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| 2 |
ID:
091790
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Private security companies' growing participation in U.S. and international military missions has raised concern about whether the private security industry is subject to sufficient controls. Industry self-regulation is often proposed as part of a multilayered framework of regulations to govern PSCs. But what can self-regulation contribute to regulation of the private security industry? This matters because privatization in the security realm has moved beyond understandings of the proper breakdown of public and private functions concerning the use of force. This article assesses what self-regulation can contribute to the control of this industry and whether the private security industry lends itself to effective self-regulation. It concludes that the private security industry does not exhibit the capacity to adopt and implement effective self-regulation on its own. If self-regulation is to complement state and international regulation, participation in the design and oversight of self-regulation must be broadened beyond private security companies alone.
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| 3 |
ID:
132051
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2014.
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With governments increasingly contracting private military and security companies (PMSCs) to perform military and police-related tasks, international relations scholars have made attempts to better understand PMSCs and to investigate the reasons for the boom of private security. Rather than focusing on the services these companies offer, which has been a common approach, we offer an identity-based explanation for their surge. We show that PMSCs eclectically assume identities related to the military, business managers and humanitarians, independent of the services they perform, their market segment or their location on the battlefield. This finding points to an important yet little-noted dimension in the private security industry. Although companies are heterogeneous, they also appear increasingly homogeneous because they incorporate a similar set of identities. On the one hand, this enables PMSCs to adapt to any context, client or employee, and, on the other hand, it has constitutive qualities, contributing to an important source of power for the respective companies. These multiple identities contribute to a norm of what a superior security provider should look like.
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| 4 |
ID:
090762
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article's goal is to cast a net wider to consider how the private security industry may affect with Canadian forces position as Canada's official organisation charged with the responsibility to employ violence when needed overseas. The article's objective is to examine how Canada presently relies upon private security companies and why this reliance has come about.
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| 5 |
ID:
086359
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Private security companies (PSCs) have experienced explosive growth since 2001, growth that has been matched only by the consequent explosion in academic attention probing their influence. It is not hard to discover that PSCs and their employees constituted the second-largest member of the US-led Coalition of the Willing during the invasion of Iraq in 2003;1 that this represented a 10-fold increase compared with the first Gulf War in 1991;2 that there are between 15,000 and 50,000 contractors currently operating in Iraq, according to various estimates;3 and that these companies suffer, at the very least, from a dearth of effective regulation4 that some go as far as to call a vacuum.5 However, there has been very little analysis of the consequences of the use of such companies in civil wars. PSCs have the potential, because they are non-state actors, privately motivated, and often external to the conflict, to complicate civil wars. Indeed, the use of PSCs by the US (by far the largest employer of contractors, as PSC employees are often called) has been characterised by a notable absence of planning and policy, both military and governmental. The United Kingdom, which is host to a number of major companies, has similarly failed to examine the policy consequences of the private security industry. This article examines how the absence of effective policy about the effects of privatising force has led to a series of unintended consequences that are influencing and will continue to influence the nature of civil wars. The first section begins by briefly outlining the nature of the private security industry and the roles it plays in civil wars. The second section examines how poor planning has led to problems for the US in its interventions into civil wars, focusing particularly on the private security industry in Iraq. The third section addresses how a similar lack of policy has caused the UK difficulties in the past, and could mean the UK will face problems in conflicts in the future.
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