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| 1 |
ID:
086457
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2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article uses the strategic theory of Carl von Clausewitz to analyze how the 2008 elections in Taiwan and the United States may influence cross-Strait relations. The elections will affect governments, citizens, and armed forces, and thus the value Taiwan and the United States attach to preserving the island's de facto independence from the mainland. Surveying likely interactions across the Taiwan Strait, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the China-Taiwan-U.S. strategic triangle includes one power, China, whose Clausewitzian "trinity" remains uniformly locked on eventual unification with Taiwan and whose patience is finite; a second, Taiwan, whose government and people are ambivalent and whose military preparations are lagging; and a third, the United States, whose government and people have priorities that do not include a clash with China, whose military is shrinking, and whose officer corps wants to avoid fighting in the Strait. This mismatch in political commitments and capabilities suggests that, far from bringing about an enduring rapprochement, the elections have done little to dispel potential conflict in East Asia.
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| 2 |
ID:
139094
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This article examines the term ‘assassination’ as describing a certain kind of killing which may – and does – occur in warfare. It critiques current definitions of the term to synthesise a stronger and more value-neutral definition: the premeditated killing of a specific individual in order to realise political objectives. It also critiques the term ‘targeted killing’ for a comparative lack of analytical clarity. The article then presents a theory of the goals assassination may achieve and the effects it may have on a conflict environment, when occurring within a military context. The article reviews three case studies which illustrate the scope of the theory, and concludes by noting that assassination can be the subject of legitimate ethical debate, as it may potentially adhere to the norms of Just War Theory, while constituting a valid category of military action.
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| 3 |
ID:
120287
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The question of whether or not cyber war amounts to war per se is difficult to determine given strategic theory's uncertain grasp of the concepts of force, violence and lethality. These three concepts, along with their relationships with one another, are explored in order to demonstrate that cyber attacks can in fact be construed as acts of war.
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| 4 |
ID:
163136
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| Publication |
Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press Ltd, 2018.
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| Description |
xix, 572p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9781474423281
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 059567 | 320.5/SCH 059567 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
115215
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2012.
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If all violence is intended to achieve political effects, what is distinctive about escalation in irregular war? Indeed, what is irregular war? To answer such fundamental questions this analysis employs the principles of strategic theory in an attempt to offer a theoretical and practical framework that will facilitate an appreciation of the subsequent contributions to this special issue. The assessment seeks to articulate how the escalation process in conditions of so-called irregular war might be conceptualized and, via examples, illustrate how certain broad observations may be held to be true. Ultimately, though, the argument emphasizes that the process of escalation cannot be distinctive or follow predictable patterns given that all wars are unique to their time and place and will be affected in their conduct by the contingent forces of passion, chance and reason.
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| 6 |
ID:
164297
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Colin Gray once lamented the absence of a ‘Mahan for the final frontier’ and spacepower theory in strategic studies. This article proposes the command of space as the fundamental concept of spacepower theory, and that Mahan himself has much to offer in the endeavour of spacepower theory-making than has hitherto been realised. The theory is advanced by tempering versions of the ‘command of space’, stressing its educational intent, and explaining the nuanced sub-concepts of space control and denial through understanding some precedents set by seapower theory. In the process, aspects of Mahanian and Corbettian seapower theory are unified.
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| 7 |
ID:
164700
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Hybrid warfare is the latest of the terms/concepts that have been used within the defence community in the last three decades to label contemporary warfare. It has been officially adopted in the core strategic documents of NATO, EU and national governments and has already inspired many articles, policy papers and books; however, this paper is unique in the sense that it analysis the hybrid warfare concept through the lens of strategic theory. It is argued that hybrid warfare does not merit the adoption as a doctrinal concept. Strategic theory instead, which lies at the nexus of all dimensions of warfare, provides a better viewpoint to approach contemporary warfare. It concludes that efforts should be directed towards exploring warfare under the light of eternal principles instead of proving the emergence of new types of warfare.
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| 8 |
ID:
177990
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Strategy is action in space and time. It is impossible to conceive of strategic behaviour outside of time, and the management of temporal factors plays a substantial role in determining the path and outcome of conflict. Yet time’s role in strategy has been empirically under-studied and theoretically neglected by scholars. This paper addresses this by identifying four constituent concepts of time for strategists: Order, Duration, Significance and Transition. The paper explores how each applies to and can improve our understanding of strategic behaviour. The paper concludes by outlining some of the promising avenues of policy opportunity and scholarly research.
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| 9 |
ID:
165096
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This special issue explores military strategy in the twenty-first century. The articles scrutinise strategy from three perspectives: the study of strategy, and how our understanding of strategy has changed over time; new areas for strategic theory, i.e., areas where the development of war has made strategy become more important, such as peacekeeping operations and cyberspace; and the makers of strategy, more specifically why states choses suboptimal strategies and how wars in the twenty-first century influence strategy makers.
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| 10 |
ID:
148053
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Colin Gray’s dimensions of strategy, built upon the earlier work of Clausewitz and Howard, has theoretical, practical, and pedagogic value for the Strategic Studies community. This paper further develops the theory, arguing that the dimensions can be controlled or managed to improve strategic performance. The dimensions are divided into two categories: “internal” and “external” to the process of strategy. The paper describes the dynamic process by which the internal dimensions, which can be controlled, are used to exert influence over the external dimensions that are beyond the control of the strategist. It is argued that six dimensions hold the key to strategic success: politics and the five dimensions concerned with warfighting. This conclusion validates the Clausewitzian paradigm with its emphasis on policy and battle.
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| 11 |
ID:
094200
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| Publication |
London, Routledge, 2007.
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| Description |
x, 313p.
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| Series |
Strategy and history ; 18
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| Standard Number |
9780415371032
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 054814 | 355.4092/OSI 054814 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 12 |
ID:
115314
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| 13 |
ID:
156672
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| Summary/Abstract |
In his 1987 work Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1987), Edward Luttwak described strategy as a field of activity characterised not only by an innately complex relationship between designs, actions and outcomes, but so too by the frequent disparity between its theory and praxis. Similar observations on this subject have since been made by Richard K. Betts, Lawrence Freedman and Antulio Echevarria II. This article will use the Allied invasion of Sicily in July–August 1943 as a vehicle through which to test these theories against a signal event in the European theatre of the Second World War. It will illustrate how Operation Husky and its aftermath are a paradigm of the confusing and often illogical course of events associated with the process of formulating strategy and waging war. In so doing it demonstrates the benefits of using strategic theory to illuminate events and so move beyond the often insular focus of campaign histories, and simultaneously reinforces the importance of military history in informing a theoretical understanding of strategy.
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