| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the creation of the Atlantic Alliance in 1949, the Alliance's minor partners have persistently spent a smaller share of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on military measures than their larger brothers-in-arms do. Taking my cue from collective goods theory, I examine the factors shaping the armament behaviour and military spending patterns of the smaller allies. The article's main theoretical argument is that the smallest among allies tend to perceive their military instruments as the price of admission to a collective defence organization upheld by larger and more potent powers. In essence, military spending becomes the price of security guarantees and protection. Consequently, small allies raise their military expenditures when their security-guaranteeing senior partner threatens with sanctions that the small ally considers more costly than the requested increase in military expenditures and not as a response to rising threats. In the second section of the article, this theoretical claim is illustrated and assessed against Denmark's Cold War defence policies. The empirical findings corroborate the belief that the small allies' leading policy-makers view their armed forces as a necessary evil maintained in order to profit from their senior partners' capabilities.
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