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| 1 |
ID:
086612
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The key missile defense questions facing policymakers today are what kind of systems should be fielded and to what extent should investments be made in future missile defense technologies. In recent years, some have argued that more investments are needed to counter theater-range missile threats, even if such investments come at the expense of developing future capabilities. On the surface, this approach seems reasonable given the sizable increase in the number of short-range ballistic missiles around the world. However, such an approach could undermine the U.S.' ability to defend against an adversary that might not be deterred by offensive forces alone. Moreover, it would not provide a meaningful capability in the long term that could dissuade an adversary from investing in ballistic missiles in the first place. This paper argues that the United States can achieve the deterrence and defense objectives set out for its missile defense forces only by sustaining a program that is balanced between the deployment of nearterm defenses and the development of advanced technologies, and between the fielding of defenses against theater-range threats and long-range threats to the American homeland.
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| 2 |
ID:
104092
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
With President Barack Obama's recent pledge to work toward U.S. Senate ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (the Treaty or CTBT) as quickly as possible and with emerging consensus in Washington on the need to take action to stop nuclear proliferation, ratification is a more realistic possibility in the near future than at any point in the last decade. Yet, despite this positive momentum, ratification could likely depend on the votes of several moderate Senate Republicans. This paper argues that while moderate Republicans might support the Treaty's goals, they are not likely to vote in favor of ratification. This paper examines the consequences of not ratifying the Treaty and concludes that, with the current U.S. moratorium on testing still in place, ratification at this time is not necessary to achieve U.S. non-proliferation goals. In fact, failing to secure ratification, a real possibility, could have significant political consequences for the Obama Administration and might set back U.S. nuclear non-proliferation efforts for years to come.
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