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| 1 |
ID:
086663
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
According to a recent RAND report, the United States will not be able to defend Taiwan from Chinese military aggression by 2020. However, this study, like many others, raises more questions than it answers about the People's Republic of China's (PRC's) current defense posture. Is there a Chinese plan to claim Taiwan by force after 2020? In contrast to the conclusions of the RAND report, this article argues that China's strategic approach is not designed primarily for fighting a war over Taiwan, or over any other matter of critical interest to China, but to create a disposition of forces so favorable to Beijing that China will not need to fight a war.
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| 2 |
ID:
098450
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Chinese strategists believe the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) offers a 'historic opportunity' to alter the military balance with the United States. Having long downplayed the People's Liberation Army (PLA)'s capabilities and aims, China is now publicizing its capacity to inflict damage while cultivating uncertainty about its precise intentions to induce caution in adversaries. Key dimensions of China's RMA include complementary kinetic and information attacks and the substitution of 'information deterrence' for nuclear deterrence. Contrary to earlier analyses focused on a decisive surprise strike, current journal articles emphasize the need for 'serialized' information and kinetic attacks. Chinese strategists may err in three ways, however: They may underestimate US resilience; they may overestimate the PLA's ability to conduct 'warfare engineering'; and China's peacetime preparations for the RMA may incite an unexpected response.
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