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| 1 |
ID:
092864
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| 2 |
ID:
126918
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| 3 |
ID:
086790
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
One needs only glance at a map to see that Saudi Arabia and the small Gulf Emirates would have a great deal to fear from a nuclear-armed Iran seeking to extend its influence beyond its borders. The open identification of these states with a perceived Sunni Arab interest in the region might be expected to further exacerbate fear of Iran and a desire to counter its ambitions. Fear of Iran certainly does exist in these countries.
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| 4 |
ID:
103558
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| 5 |
ID:
160066
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although Pakistan was created as a homeland for South Asia's Muslims, religious freedom was one of its founding principles. Seventy years later, Pakistan is better known for religious extremism and the persecution of Muslim and non-Muslim religious minorities. Pakistan's blasphemy law is a state-sanctioned tool of religious oppression used to target members of minority faith communities whether Ahmadiya, Christian, Hindu, or Shiite, as well as Sunnis who criticize the law. This paper discusses the blasphemy law and other laws that have led to the state of religious oppression in Pakistan.
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| 6 |
ID:
190090
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| Summary/Abstract |
Sectarian-based violent extremism has long been a security concern for the Government of Pakistan. Despite the perseverance of state authorities in countering violent extremism, a discourse centered on horizontal inequalities as the determinant of violent extremism and conflict remains lacking. This paper highlights the importance of an empirical study in understanding the nexus between horizontal inequalities and sectarian-based violent extremism in Gilgit-Baltistan (GB). By analyzing the responses from Shia and Sunni sectarian identities, the study contextualizes violent conflict and elucidates how horizontal inequalities intersect with sectarian identities in the capital city of GB. In doing so, socioeconomic and cultural inequalities have been evaluated. The study relies on a multistage random sample of 212 respondents through a structured questionnaire. The findings reflect significant socioeconomic inequalities between the sectarian identities and suggest a linear relationship in which horizontal inequalities generate identity-driven “us” vs “them.”
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| 7 |
ID:
096455
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| 8 |
ID:
102405
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The world breathed a sigh of relief at the announcement of a new Iraqi government on 21 December 2010. After nine months of wrangling following the 7 March elections, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki finally engineered a deal that kept him in place at the head of a 42-person cabinet. Maliki was unable to name a full coterie of ministers; ten of the portfolios, including the main security ministries, are being managed on a temporary basis by other ministers until permanent nominations are made. Nevertheless, approval of the cabinet brought to an end a crisis that left the political system in limbo and saw a deterioration of the security situation.
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| 9 |
ID:
100134
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| 10 |
ID:
110318
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
WITH U.S. combat troops out of Iraq and that country facing an uncertain future, many challenges hover over the lands of old Mesopotamia. The most ominous is the unsettled struggle over power, territory and resources among the country's political elites. While often described in straightforward ethnic and sectarian terms, this strife has gone through many phases. Various alliances have come together and broken apart as the power struggle has shifted from a sectarian street war to heightened tensions between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Erbil. Most recently, the main axis of confrontation has been between Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki's Shia-led government and its putative governing partner, the mostly Sunni Iraqiya list.
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| 11 |
ID:
118316
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article focuses on the impact of the Arab Spring on pre-existing societal cleavages, specifically analyzing its impact on Sunni-Shiite relations. How have Sunni-Shiite relationships been reshaped by the ongoing social protests? Is there a rise in the inter-religious tensions among Sunni and Shiite communities across the region? And, if that is the case, what are the implications of this trend on both the region's potential for democratization, as well as on its overall stability and security?
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| 12 |
ID:
127538
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| 13 |
ID:
146757
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| 14 |
ID:
121524
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| 15 |
ID:
127222
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| 16 |
ID:
122004
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Writing for the Washington Post in April, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki argued that 'the United States has not "lost" Iraq. Instead, in Iraq, the United States has found a partner for our shared strategic concerns and our common efforts on energy, economics and the promotion of peace and democracy.' A lot of people in the United States do not see it that way. They regard Iraq's democratisation efforts over the course of eight years as wasted. Many Americans view Maliki as increasingly sectarian and authoritarian, and aligned with Iran, especially in his support of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad, an important ally of Tehran. They see little of Iraq's vast oil wealth trickling down to benefit its population. They wonder whether Iraq can survive as a single state as relations between Baghdad and the Kurdistan capital of Erbil deteriorate; Sunnis block major roads in protest against Maliki; the government prevents demonstrations in Baghdad and predominantly Sunni insurgents continue to carry out bombings.
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| 17 |
ID:
129379
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| 18 |
ID:
091058
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The recent thawing of relations between Washington and Tehran has fueled Arab apprehension about Iran's growing influence in the region, in Iraq in particular. In this context, Arab regimes sometimes attempt to exploit the shiite and Persian nature of Tehran's policies, portraying them as threatening sunni Arabs all over the Middle East.
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| 19 |
ID:
137294
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| Summary/Abstract |
THERE IS EVERY REASON to describe the Syrian conflict as an open confrontation between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (IRI) in the Middle East. "Iran and the Saudis are two main political opponents in the region. Today when the fog which enveloped their relations for a long time finally dissipated this has become even more obvious than before."1 Saudi Arabia which relies on the Sunni doctrine of Islam as the cornerstone of its statehood is acutely aware of Iranian pressure too close to its borders: pro-Iranian Iraq in the north, Shi'a disturbances in Bahrain which echo in the kingdom's Eastern Province and clashes between the government troops and Houthi rebels in Yemen. This leaves the KSA no other alternative but to wipe the Ba'ath regime in Syria, one of Iran's loyal allies, off the political map of the world. The escalating revolution in Syria has offered the members of the Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) a unique chance to try harder to isolate Iran and weaken its regional influence.
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| 20 |
ID:
126232
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