| Srl | Item |
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ID:
089625
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| Publication |
DelhI, Prashant Publishing House, 2009.
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| Description |
256p.
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| Standard Number |
9788190828215
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 054248 | 355.34/SIN 054248 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
106809
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| 3 |
ID:
090488
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| 4 |
ID:
086819
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
At the tip of the spear of the invasion of Iraq in 2003, Army Special Forces Maj. James gavrilis found himself forced to rely on common sense, the trust of Iraqis and recollections from Political Science 101 to manage and govern the city of Al Rutbah. He had received no guidance or assistance in managing a sunni city of nearly 25,000 citizens.Today's young leaders are called upon in Iraq, Afghanistan, Bosnia and Kosovo to use diplomatic skills and tools for civil military operations for which most have received limited formal training.
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| 5 |
ID:
103654
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
President George W. Bush's Iraq surge decision in late 2006 is an interesting case for civil-military relations theory, in particular, the debate between professional supremacists and civilian supremacists over how much to defer to the military on decisions during war. The professional supremacists argue that the primary problem for civil-military relations during war is ensuring the military an adequate voice and keeping civilians from micromanaging and mismanaging matters. Civilian supremacists, in contrast, argue that the primary problem is ensuring that well-informed civilian strategic guidance is authoritatively directing key decisions, even when the military disagrees with that direction. A close reading of the available evidence-both in published accounts and in new, not-for-attribution interviews with the key players-shows that the surge decision vindicates neither camp. If President Bush had followed the professional supremacists, there would have been no surge because his key military commanders were recommending against that option. If Bush had followed the civilian supremacists to the letter, however, there might have been a revolt of the generals, causing the domestic political props under the surge to collapse. Instead, Bush's hybrid approach worked better than either ideal type would have.
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