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| 1 |
ID:
181129
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| Summary/Abstract |
States accused of perpetrating cyber operations typically do not confirm or deny responsibility. They issue ‘non-denial denials’ or refuse to comment on the accusations. These ambiguous signals are prevalent, but they are largely ignored in the existing cyber literature, which tends to treat credit claiming as a binary choice. The ambiguity of non-denial denials and ‘non-comments’ allows states to accomplish two seemingly opposed goals: maintaining crisis stability and leaving open the possibility of their involvement in the attack. By deliberately remaining a suspect, a state can manipulate rivals’ perceptions of its cyber capability and resolve. Refusing to deny responsibility can also shape rivals’ perceptions of allies’ capabilities, enhancing the credibility of deterrence. All of this can be accomplished without the escalatory risks that would come with an explicit admission of responsibility. Where previous research has focused on the dangers of escalation and the limitations of costly signalling with cyber, we show that non-denial denials and non-comments make cyber operations considerably more useful than the literature appreciates.
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| 2 |
ID:
186761
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| 3 |
ID:
159189
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| Summary/Abstract |
Cyberspace is an avenue of approach through which a military force can attain objectives of value. Through these cyber avenues of approach, military forces can engage, vet, organize, and direct human agents to accomplish specific activities. Although the objectives of these activities could differ from traditional military objectives, they still have military relevance. This particular manifestation of cyber conflict is neither a new domain of war nor something outside of warfare. Rather, it can be viewed as an emerging avenue of approach in the larger context of military operations, auguring benefits in the integration of cyber activities with operations.
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| 4 |
ID:
132419
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Covert action is as old as political man. The subversive manipulation of others is nothing new. It has been written about since Sun Tzu and Kautilya. People and nations have always sought the use of shadowy means to influence situations and events. Covert action is and has been a staple of the state system. A dark and nefarious tool often banished to philosophical and intellectual exile, covert action is in truth an oft-used method of achieving utility that is frequently overlooked by academics. Modern scholars contend that, for utility to be achieved, activities such as war and diplomacy must be conducted transparently. Examined here is the construction of utility for a subset of covert action: cyber attacks.
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| 5 |
ID:
171960
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the last decade, cyber incidents have become more expensive, more disruptive, and in many cases more political, with a new body of theoretically informed research emerging in parallel. This article provides the intellectual history to situate this literature in its broader evolutionary context. After identifying and discussing six drivers from the fields of technology, politics, and science that have been influential in the evolution of cyber security politics and how it is studied, we describe three historically contingent clusters of research. Using the same driving factors to look into the future of research on cyber security politics, we conclude that it is a vibrant and diverse biotope that is benefitting from its interdisciplinarity, its relevance for policy, and its cognizance of the interplay between technological possibilities and political choices of state actors.
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| 6 |
ID:
141532
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Satyam Law International, 2013.
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| Description |
ix, 246p.: ill.pbk
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| Standard Number |
9789382823001
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058334 | 355.033002854678/REV 058334 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 7 |
ID:
181217
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| Summary/Abstract |
For nearly thirty years scholars have offered changing definitions of cyberwar. The continued ambiguity demonstrates that efforts at establishing definitional clarity have not been successful. As a result, there are many different and contradictory definitions, ranging from cyberwar’s non-existence to cyberwar as an imminent threat. Ongoing definitional ambiguity makes interdisciplinary research and policy communications challenging in this diverse field. Instead of offering a new definition, this paper proposes that cyberwar can be understood through a fluid framework anchored in three themes and five variables identified in a broad interdisciplinary survey of literature. This framework's applicability is demonstrated by constructing an example definition of cyberwar utilising these themes and variables.
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| 8 |
ID:
162725
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| Summary/Abstract |
The debate about state behaviour in cyberspace may be set in the wrong legal key.
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| 9 |
ID:
165132
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the last decade, cyber conflict has become a main feature of international politics and a growing concern for strategic stability and collective security. Unfortunately, cyber conflict suffers from a lack of conceptual clarity about its impact on collective security and a lack of consensus among international actors on how to interpret it. This article proposes to understand cyber conflict as an evolving process driven by two factors: the way in which digital space is configured and the way in which tactical, organizational, strategic, and doctrinal characteristics related to cyber have been included in the field of national and international security. Both tend to encourage offensive behavior but also demonstrate features pointing to restraint.
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| 10 |
ID:
132349
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Much discussion of the concept of cyberwar, cyber conflict, and the changing dynamic of future security interactions is founded upon the study of what could be, conjured through spectacular flights of the imagination. The goal of this research article is to exhaustively collect information on cyber interactions between rival states in the last decade so that we can delineate the patterns of cyber conflict as reflected by evidence at the international level. The field of cyber security needs a clear return to social science in order to be able to definitively engage the cyber debate with facts, figures, and theory. To that end we provide a dataset of cyber incidents and cyber disputes that spans from 2001 to 2011. Our data include 110 cyber incidents and 45 cyber disputes. Further, we test our theory of cyber conflict which argues that restraint and regionalism should be expected, counter-intuitive to conventional wisdom. We find here that the actual magnitude and pace of cyber disputes among rivals does not match with popular perception; 20 of 126 active rivals engaged in cyber conflict. The interactions that are uncovered are limited in terms of magnitude and frequency suggesting cyber restraint. Further, most of the cyber disputes that are uncovered are regional in tone, defying the unbounded nature of cyberpower. The coming era of cyber conflict may continue to exhibit these patterns despite fears mentioned in the discourse by the media and cyber security professionals.
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| 11 |
ID:
086831
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On 19 July 2008 an Internet security reported a distributed denial of service (DDOS) cyber attack against web sites in the country of Georgia. Three week later, on 8 August, security experts observed a second, more substantial round of DDOS attcks against Georgian web sites.
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| 12 |
ID:
174826
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Why has India developed into one of the world’s top targets and sources of cyber attacks despite possessing a strategic edge in information and communications technology (ICT)? India has one of the most competitive ICT industries and workforces, largest global sourcing and fastest growing e-commerce markets, and second largest and fastest growing internet user base, and is a leader in using ICT to provide governance services, yet its economic and political information infrastructures have been disproportionality affected by cyber attacks. This article traces the evolution of cyber threats to India’s national security and identifies drivers of the national and international policies the Indian state has adopted to address these threats in the past two decades. It finds evidence for a growing gap between the ideation and implementation of cyber security legislation and policy, which is rooted in the political constraints inherent in India’s state capacity-building efforts, reluctance to engage in multistakeholder coordination, and struggles to yield gains from its hedging diplomacy in global cyber security negotiations. For the Security Studies scholarship on the sources of cyber insecurity, these findings highlight the need to further study the links between different types of cyber capacity, state structure and political systems as well as the specific conditions under which quickly digitizing democracies can effectively translate their ICT capacities and regulations into greater cyber resilience.
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| 13 |
ID:
182673
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| Summary/Abstract |
A state’s decision to engage in cyber operations has important implications for its trade. Successful cyber espionage could yield valuable trade secrets that could boost domestic production and spur economic growth. On the other hand, uncovered cyber operations could invite devastating sanctions that retard economic development. In spite of this, the nexus between trade and cyber attacks has received little attention in the literature. In this article, I explore how a state’s trade relations affect its propensity to engage in cyber attacks. I develop a theoretical framework that links the composition of a state’s trade to its deficit in proprietary information relative to other states. I decompose trade into its inter- and intra-industry components and show that while inter-industry trade is associated with higher incidence of state-sponsored cyber attacks, intra-industry trade has the opposite effect. I also show that these effects are non-monotonic, varying by the share of inter- or intra-industry trade in total trade. The results also show that states that have a heavy concentration of high-tech industries such as aerospace, computers, and pharmaceuticals have a higher propensity to engage in cyber espionage operations. These results are robust to a variety of controls and specifications.
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| 14 |
ID:
125249
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
the national cyber security system (NCSS) of South Korea came under criticism when North Korean cyber terrorist attacked the office computers and servers of major south Korean broadcasting and financial companies on March 20, 2013. The NCSS had evolved up to that time by addressing problems, that arose from incidents dating to the January 25, 2003, internet crisis, the March 4, 2011 distributed denial of service (DDoS) crisis, and other event occurring between those attacks. The above 2013 cyber terrorism incident magnified the limits of NCSS leadership, expertise and collaborative systems, while revealing that past reform were nothing more than stopgap measures.
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| 15 |
ID:
096857
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| 16 |
ID:
190774
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| Summary/Abstract |
Theorizing on cyber conflict has moved from warfare to conflict short of war, but strategic thought has not kept pace. This article argues cyber conflict is subversive, builds on intelligence scholarship to identify strategies of subversion, and examines their applicability in cyber conflict. It distinguishes three subversive strategies: manipulation, erosion and overthrow. The analysis shows cyber operations can only implement one of these strategies (erosion), indicating they offer less strategic value than traditional counterparts. Accordingly, although cyber operations offer superior scale, I argue their scope of influence is more limited. Finally, the article discusses strategic implications and identifies possible counterstrategies.
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