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ID:
177670
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the Taliban’s insurgency (2007–9) in Swat valley (Pakistan), with two objectives: (a) how civilians survive violence and (b) what their survival strategies mean for them. Drawing on in-depth interviews and focus group discussions, conducted in 2016 to 2019, it offers a typology of civilians’ survival strategies which includes resistance, accommodation, readjustment and withdrawal. It finds that although the strategies worked, resistance and accommodation have had a detrimental impact on civilians in the form of direct violence. In comparison, readjustment and withdrawal helped them avoiding direct violence but have had a negative impact on civilian life and society.
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| 2 |
ID:
086890
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The gruesome scene of a young girl being flogged in public illustrates the brutal rule the Taliban have enforced in the Swat valley, raising serious questions about the government's policy of appeasement of militants trying to push the country back to the Dark Ages.
The two-minute video showing a black-turbaned man holding down the girl's feet, another her head while a third man hits her with a leather strap, has shaken the nation and exposed the brutal face of the illiterate mullahs holding sway in a large part of northwestern Pakistan.
The incident, which took place in Kabal district in January and surfaced only recently, is a stark reminder of where Pakistan is heading if the growing threat of Islamic extremism is not checked. The government and the military have surrendered the valley to the militants, who are responsible for the killing of hundreds of people. The so-called peace deal has legitimised the Taliban brutalities, and emboldened the radicals - who now aim to spread their influence to other parts of the country.
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| 3 |
ID:
089800
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The army has fought its way into alsmost all of Swat Valley but significant questions remain about the success of operation Rah-e-Rast
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| 4 |
ID:
089801
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the context of three failed operations conducted in Swat since November 2007, which left locals skeptical about the army's willingness to eliminate the Taliban threat, these discrepancies of just a few days become more significant than perhaps they should be in terms of shaping public perception. Observers and residents say they have more faith this time around, mainly because they can see increased troop numbers and more sophisticated equipment. But lack of clarity regarding the timing of the Swat operation raises questions about the transparency of the operation as a whole.
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