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| 1 |
ID:
150539
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| Summary/Abstract |
The US rebalance to the Asia Pacific is consistently interpreted as a response to China’s material rise. While not entirely incorrect, this assumption – derived from an overriding faith in the explanatory significance of relative state capabilities – fails to explain why rapidly rising others, most notably India, remain absent from regional US security discourse, and why a heavy US presence in Asia predates China’s ascent of the 1970s onwards. To address these problems and offer an improved explanation of what the rebalance is, how and why it has come about, and what it is designed to achieve within the context of China’s rise, this analysis draws from critical geopolitics and postcolonial theory. It argues that the rebalance is best conceived as the (re)articulation of historical discourses which construct certain foreign Others like China as challenges to the ontological American self, making the rebalance an attempt to pacify a particular rising identity as much as a rising state actor. The analysis is motivated in part by the question of how the rebalance is enabled in its current form. From here, the article addresses an increasing yet regressive tendency of International Relations theory to deny studies of the ‘how possible’ explanatory value, encouraging their marginalisation in favour of examinations into ‘why’ political decisions are made.
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| 2 |
ID:
086980
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China has been a major power for far longer than is typically acknowledged in the West. This paper seeks to redress established discourse of China as a 'rising' power which now enjoys common usage within Western policy-making, academic and popular circles, particularly within the United States; China can more accurately be conceived of as a 'recovering power'. A tendency by successive Washington administrations to view the world in realist terms has forced the label of 'rising' power onto China along with the negative connotations that inevitably follow. We should acknowledge the folly in utilising a theoretical approach largely devoid of any appreciation for the social and human dimensions of international relations as well as the importance of social discourse in the field. Finally, policy-makers in Washington must reconsider their realist stance and, with a fuller appreciation of world history, recognise that American hegemony was always destined to be short-lived.
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| 3 |
ID:
122834
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the modern day role and purpose of the UN Special Committee on Decolonization. Since its establishment in the 1960s the Committee has helped numerable former colonies achieve independence. Today, with very few 'colonised' Non-Self-Governing Territories remaining its work appears almost complete. However, serious flaws have always pervaded its decolonisation strategy; which are now more apparent than ever. The Committee retains narrow and outdated understandings of colonialism and, as a result, fails to recognise how widespread and pervasive global colonial forces remain. This makes its goal of universal decolonisation both unsatisfactory and misguided. The Committee's problematic approach towards decolonisation stems from its participation within the 'North-South Theatre', in which antagonism is perpetuated between the world's developed and less developed states. The paper argues that the Committee has not prioritised colonised peoples in the way it has always claimed, but instead worked principally in the interests of itself and its members.
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| 4 |
ID:
167605
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| Summary/Abstract |
Scholars debate the ambitions and policies of today’s ‘rising powers’ and the extent to which they are revising or upholding the international status quo. While elements of the relevant literature provide valuable insight, this article argues that the concepts of revisionism and the status quo within mainstream International Relations (IR) have always constituted deeply rooted, autobiographical narratives of a traditionally Western-dominated discipline. As ‘ordering narratives’ of morality and progress, they constrain and organize debate so that revisionism is typically conceived not merely as disruption, but as disruption from the non-West amidst a fundamentally moral Western order that represents civilizational progress. This often makes them inherently problematic and unreliable descriptors of the actors and behaviours they are designed to explain. After exploring the formations and development of these concepts throughout the IR tradition, the analysis is directed towards narratives around the contemporary ‘rise’ of China. Both scholarly and wider political narratives typically tell the story of revisionist challenges China presents to a US/Western-led status quo, promoting unduly binary divisions between the West and non-West, and tensions and suspicions in the international realm. The aim must be to develop a new language and logic that recognize the contingent, autobiographical nature of ‘revisionist’ and ‘status quo’ actors and behaviours.
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| 5 |
ID:
179803
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is often noted that former US President Donald Trump brought unpredictability to Washington’s relationship with China. This may appear intuitively true, but in what ways was Trump actually ‘unpredictable’ towards China? We show that the most unpredictable feature of Trump’s approach was his rhetoric, strongly defined by impulsivity, emotion and provocation. This generated rhetorical unpredictability which was regularly seen in inconsistent and contradictory statements. Using political psychology and leadership personality approaches, we further demonstrate that this unpredictable rhetoric can be traced to Trump’s psychological profile. We argue that while the composition of Trump’s China rhetoric was often difficult to anticipate, as a component of his US China policy it was predictable to the extent that it was grounded in his personality. Trumpian China policy broadly followed longer-term trends, but the president’s erratic rhetoric had domestic and international consequences for the relationship. The article further contributes to work on unpredictability in international relations (IR), and on leadership personalities and foreign policy.
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| 6 |
ID:
167133
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This article explores the UK’s foreign policy “pivot” to Asia, a decade after its tentative beginnings. This pivot is understood to be Britain’s planned redirection of attention and resources to Asia which emerged gradually from around 2007/2008, before intensifying from 2010. It is argued that the pivot has been evident across distinctive phases and political, economic and security dimensions, while lacking organisation, clarity and purpose, leaving it partial and incomplete. Examined are the motivations for the pivot and the forms it has taken, its accomplishments and ultimately what the pivot reveals about the role and influence the UK claims in Asia today. It is shown that in its key trade and investment aims, the pivot has achieved mixed results, doing little to enhance the UK’s position as a tertiary-level partner of Asia. However, Britain’s agency and importance is best explained not by its quantities, but its qualities, of power, occupying the regional roles of “subcontractor” and “facilitator”. Finally, the article looks to Britain’s future in Asia. Exiting the EU would likely see the UK retain its status of subcontractor, while its ability to act as facilitator would almost certainly diminish. The article concludes by arguing that, despite the rhetoric of the pivot, Britain’s presence in Asia will never be defined by its quantities of material power, and that it should work to sustain the qualities of power on which its regional presence is built.
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| 7 |
ID:
123389
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2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
China's increasing capabilities are a central focus of modern day US security concerns. The International Relations literature is a key forum for analyses of the so-called 'China threat' and yet it remains relatively quiet on the role of ideas in the construction and perpetuation of the dangers that country is understood to present. This article reveals that throughout history 'threats' from China towards the United States, rather than objectively verifiable phenomena, have always been social constructions of American design and thus more than calculations of material forces. Specifically, it argues that powerful and pervasive American representations of China have been repeatedly and purposefully responsible for creating a threatening identity. It also demonstrates that these representations have enabled and justified US China policies which themselves have reaffirmed the identities of both China and the United States, protecting the latter when seemingly threatened by the former. Three case studies from across the full duration of Sino-American relations expose the centrality of ideas to historical and contemporary understandings of China 'threats', and to the American foreign policies formulated in response.
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