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| 1 |
ID:
153164
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| Summary/Abstract |
A few days after I drafted the following list of attributes for an introductory class on intelligence analysis, this journal published a short thought piece by Mark Lowenthal and Ronald Marks titled “Intelligence Analysis: Is It As Good as It Gets?”1 Mark M. Lowenthal and Ronald A. Marks “Intelligence Analysis: Is It As Good As It Gets?,” International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, Vol. 28, No. 4, Winter 2015–2016, pp. 662–665.
[Taylor & Francis Online], [Google Scholar]
The authors pointed out, correctly I believe, that analysts are no more clairvoyant than their audience, and any expectations of infallibility must be removed from the objective discussion of successful analysis. What good analysts can do, however, is to bring critical insight to a national security issue and submit that insight in timely products to policymakers.
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| 2 |
ID:
087065
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The difficulty of discovering the truth on intelligence questions in vividly shown by two questions: who leaked American's ability to intercept Al-Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden's satellite telephone and when did he stop using it? Former President George W. Bush and reputable scholars and journalists have repeatedly made statements the actual truth when and if that truth in this matter, meaning bin Laden and perhaps one or more of his subordinates.
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