Srl | Item |
1 |
ID:
093627
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
Canada's 2005 International Policy Statement announced that the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade and the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces were committed to "whole of government" interventions in failed and fragile states. This led both the Canadian government and outside observers to declare that Canada was successfully harmonising the aims and practices of its internationally focused departments and crafting a synergised approach to interventions in failed and fragile states. Drawing on Halperin and Clapp's organisational theory of bureaucratic politics, this paper argues instead that the foreign affairs and defence departments embraced the idea of failed and fragile states to reinforce their organisational essences and recycle their existing missions, roles, and capabilities. In addition, the departments used a "whole of government" approach to secure their autonomy, fence their respective functions, and enlarge their unique capabilities, under the guise of greater efficiency.
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2 |
ID:
087074
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Publication |
2008.
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Summary/Abstract |
Canada has contributed to North American strategic defence, and been an ardent propent of strategic stability, since the early Cold War. Though seemingly comatible, Canada's involvement in continental strategic defence and advocacy of strategic stabiligy has been nagged by an underlying contradiction.
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3 |
ID:
094577
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4 |
ID:
190852
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Summary/Abstract |
This article examines how the French Senate engaged in legislative oversight of the military between 2015 and 2020. Drawing on semi-structured interviews with French parliamentarians, parliamentary staff, and serving and retired military leaders, the article argues that the French Senate performed “community policing” oversight of the military during this period. This community policing approach, which relies on mutual trust and cooperation between the principal and the agent, allowed senators to oversee the military and check the executive at relatively low cost, while giving military leaders a parliamentary ally in their disagreements with the President and Cabinet. The article examines what conditions enabled and encouraged the French Senate to perform this type of oversight, as well as what civil–military dynamics led the French military to view senators as allies in their policy disagreements with the President. The article finds that the 2015 terrorist attacks on French soil played an important role in establishing closer ties between the upper house and the armed forces, with the Senate securing additional capabilities for the armed forces during this time. The article concludes with avenues for future research focusing on upper houses and legislative oversight of the military.
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5 |
ID:
094578
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6 |
ID:
097064
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7 |
ID:
146499
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Summary/Abstract |
Debates about Parliament’s role in deciding military deployments are clouded by misunderstandings of the relative legal authorities of the executive and the legislature, and the mixture of political objectives and democratic obligation that inform these discussions. Much has been written about the legal aspects of this question. This article considers instead the issues of politics and principle, which we argue are consistently interwoven: while governments have elevated Parliament’s role in military deployments for political purposes, the choice to involve the legislature also reflects the idea that it is the “right thing to do” in a democracy.
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8 |
ID:
113112
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Publication |
2012.
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Summary/Abstract |
As Canada's military mission in Afghanistan winds down and the country faces several years of fiscal austerity, all of Canada's major political parties are agreed that Canadian defence budgets must stay level or be cut. This comes at a time when the defence department is slated to replace the Canadian Forces' (CF) major equipment fleets. Canada's defence establishment thus faces some critical decisions. One option is to try to maintain its expeditionary capabilities across all three services: army, navy and air force. Absent substantial new infusions of funds, however, this approach is likely to lead to an overall and largely chaotic reduction of capabilities. Another option is to make some difficult choices as to which expeditionary capabilities to maintain as part of a strategic review of Canada's future military needs. Such an option would ensure that Canada has at least some military capacities which can reliably be devoted to the most demanding international operations, while maintaining those capabilities required for domestic duties and North American defence. Pursuing this option would accord with the new North Atlantic Treaty Organization Strategic Concept and the call for "Smart Defense" within the Alliance. This article assesses the arguments for and against the option of specialising Canada's future defence capabilities and explores scenarios as to what a future CF may look like.
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