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| 1 |
ID:
166902
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| Summary/Abstract |
German organizations are among the last Palestine solidarity groups in Europe to have embraced the call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS), launched in 2005. Pro-Israel German groups have been quick to respond with aggressive rhetoric equating a BDS-favorable stance with Nazism. The vilification of the movement has had the unintended consequence of inserting BDS into German politics, both at federal and local levels. Select case studies show that the BDS debate in Germany has developed somewhat differently than in other European countries, and that religious discourse is significant in shaping attitudes to Israel and Palestine. While the Palestine solidarity movement tends to single out the “Anti-Germans”—a pro-Israel formation that grew out of the Left after the reunification of Germany—as the major culprit, it is in fact conservative Christian, mostly Evangelical, organizations that are largely responsible for discouraging BDS activism.
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| 2 |
ID:
087269
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The prevailing opinion that the Bush administration took the United States to war against Iraq in March 2003 under false pretenses has led many to believe that Israel's security was the secret rationale for the war. According to this "war for Israel" thesis, neoconservative policymakers in the Bush administration, the pro-Israel lobby in the United States, and Israel's government all pushed the United States to go to war with Iraq for the sake of Israel's security. This article critically assesses this controversial claim and examines Israel's role in the U.S. decision to invade Iraq. I argued that while neoconservatives were instrumental in promoting the Iraq war, Israel was not their primary concern and that although American Jewish organizations and the Israeli government did largely support the Iraq war, they did not seek it or actively lobby for it.
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| 3 |
ID:
181191
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| Summary/Abstract |
The special relationship between the United States and Israel has been built on three pillars: shared strategic interests, the resonance of Israel in American political culture and the influence of the pro-Israel lobby. While the strategic pillar has been the most controversial, as many in Washington have viewed Israel as a strategic liability, the dramatic improvement in relations between Israel and America’s Gulf Arab partners has diminished this concern. But the once strong cultural and domestic political pillars are now under strain. In the wake of a sharp decline in sympathy for Israel within the Democratic Party, bipartisan support for Israel is now in doubt. The new Israeli government has the potential to arrest and reverse this decline. Without progress towards a two-state solution to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, however, the challenge will remain.
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| 4 |
ID:
148605
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| Summary/Abstract |
This retrospective assessment argues that despite the arrival in office in 2009 of a president who articulated the case for Palestinian rights more strongly and eloquently than any of his predecessors, U.S. official policy in the Obama years skewed heavily in favor of Israel. While a negotiated two-state resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Palestinians continued to be the formal goal of the United States, Israel's defiant refusal to stop settlement expansion, the administration's determined actions to perpetuate Israeli impunity in international fora, as well as the U.S. taxpayer's hefty subsidy of the Israeli military machine all ensured that no progress could be made on that score. The author predicts that with all hopes of a negotiated two-state solution now shattered, Obama's successor will have to contend with an entirely new paradigm, thanks in no small part to the gathering momentum of the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) movement.
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| 5 |
ID:
175426
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| Summary/Abstract |
More than 50 years of American diplomacy in the Arab-Israeli “peace process” have revealed it to be a carousel of constant activity with no forward movement. Despite chronic failure and embarrassment, it continues in great measure because of the cumulative effects of the influence of the Israel lobby in the United States, through cycles of opportunity, initiative, retreat, and compensation. Mathematician John Nash’s theory of an inefficient equilibrium is offered as an explanation for the still-sustained pretense of the possibility of a negotiated peace agreement and the conditions under which the peace process carousel could finally stop turning.
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