| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
100980
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| 2 |
ID:
131982
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over the past few years there is an apparent re-regionalization of al-Qaeda activity, intensified by the ongoing Middle East turmoil. Its main characteristic is a trend towards the abandonment of focoist strategies and their replacement by more popular-based ones. This article aims at evaluating their capacity to implement such a strategy shift and sustain the required level of violence. As a means of evaluating this capacity, this article proposes the use of a DIME (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) framework, which will hopefully provide an alternative angle of theorizing and understanding 'armed non-state actors' (ANSAs). The model is applied in the case of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which appears to have effectively developed the military and informational dimensions, due partly to its own prowess and partly to the Yemeni state's weaknesses and the shortcomings of counterinsurgency. In contrast, the economic and diplomatic dimensions suffer from the lack of resources and the anti-systemic nature of AQAP.
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| 3 |
ID:
129948
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| 4 |
ID:
044594
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| Publication |
Boulder, Westview Press, 1982.
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| Description |
xvi, 550p.
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| Standard Number |
0865315469
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 026145 | 322.50956/HUR 026145 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 5 |
ID:
011570
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| Publication |
Jan-Feb 1997.
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| Description |
1423-1447
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| 6 |
ID:
015186
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| Publication |
1990.
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| Description |
742-61
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| 7 |
ID:
017517
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| Publication |
Spring/Summer 2000.
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| Description |
115-128
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| 8 |
ID:
089438
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| 9 |
ID:
159550
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Russian Navy played a decisive role in the opening of Alaska, though later relatively few of its ships appeared in the region, passing the baton to ships of private merchant companies and then to the Russian-American Company, which governed Alaska until its sale to the United States in 1867. Most of the company’s ships had rather limited military capabilities. Although the navy played a significant role in the development of Alaska, the military dimension to this process manifested itself relatively weakly. The ships under the Russian flag primarily carried out transport and convoy functions, shielding flotillas of company hunting baidarki [skin boats] from the attacks of hostile Indians, and later conducted formal patrols for watching foreign whaling ships. Almost the only episodes in which Russian ships were used in battle were the participation of the sloop Neva in a fight with the Tlingit Indians in 1804 and the raids of two Russian-American Company ships in 1806–1807 on Japanese villages on Sakhalin Island and the southern Kurile Islands.
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| 10 |
ID:
084997
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| Publication |
2008.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article will apply what shall be termed a "strategic hub" concept of counterinsurgency to the war in Iraq. This concept posits that the development of insurgent and militia nodes or "hubs" of activity could provide a more relevant way to address the key dilemmas of the Iraq equation in light of the Coalition and Iraq government's inability to secure Iraq. The article will argue that ceding the insurgency and militias ground on a temporary basis may be required to maintain both military and political momentum in the post "surge" Iraq given the draw down of U.S. forces, the immaturity of the Iraqi Security Forces, and the present state of American and Iraqi politics.
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