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| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
174635
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| Summary/Abstract |
Deliberations over the COVID-19 pandemic's long-term effects on the global balance of power have spurred a large and rancorous debate, including speculation about a shift in the definition of national security and prescriptions about where it should focus. That argument will no doubt continue. But we argue that one consequence is already evident: the United States has spent the last seventy years portraying itself as a security provider in all key domains—for many an intrinsic component of its status as a global leader. One reasonable broad conclusion from the US struggle with COVID-19 is that it has further forfeited its broad leadership position on the basis of its behaviour. Yet that, although possibly true, would only portray one element of the story. The more profound insight exposed by COVID-19 is of a new reality: in a world where both naturogenic and anthropogenic threats pose immense national security challenges, decades of mistaken assumptions and policy choices have created a new environment, one where the United States has been redefined as a security consumer, at least in terms of international public health issues associated with the spread of deadly infectious diseases.
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| 2 |
ID:
155474
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| Summary/Abstract |
Six months into the Trump presidency, scholars and pundits are already speculating whether the president has developed a ‘doctrine’ or, more expansively, a ‘grand strategy’. No doubt, unfolding events—in Asia, the Middle East and possibly Europe—will sustain this debate about Trump's strategy in the months and, possibly years, to come. It will be prompted by disparate events that stretch from directing vocal threats to the North Koreans regarding their nuclear program to demands that NATO members increase their defence budgets. But, stepping back from Washington's and the media's news cycle, it is worth noting that such deliberation about the Trump presidency is unexceptional. Grand strategy debates are always fashionable. What is overlooked in these raging debates is a prior question: can Donald Trump—or any other American president—implement a grand strategy in the twenty-first century? Our answer is no, they can't. Despite the professed differences among US presidential administrations, each in fact responded to them in markedly similar ways. In fact, we argue, Americans may debate a variety of grand strategies. But a combination of systemic international challenges and bureaucratic tussling between civilian and military leaders ensures that any presidential administration simultaneously implements a variety of calibrated strategies (ranging from liberal institutionalism to restraint and even neo-isolationism), depending on the circumstances.
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| 3 |
ID:
001737
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| Publication |
Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998.
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| Description |
x,193p.
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| Standard Number |
0691036365
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 041373 | 338.88/DOR 041373 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 4 |
ID:
141121
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| Summary/Abstract |
Critics of US President Barack Obama’s grand strategy have alternatively argued that the president has one and it is wrongheaded, or that he has none and needs one. This latter claim extends beyond the predictable array of Republicans jostling to contest the 2016 presidential election to include varied analysts, academics and even members of the president’s own party, notably Hillary Rodham Clinton.
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