| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is difficult to measure the size, influence and growth patterns of criminal organizations embedded in illegal markets. In this paper, we argue that measuring the influence of a criminal organization by its size (in number of employees, or 'members') may under- or overestimate its sphere of influence in illegal markets. Self-report survey and size of population methodologies are combined to assess the regional economic influence of a criminal organization (Hells Angels) in three illegal drug markets (the cocaine trade, the cannabis trade and the cannabis cultivation industry) in the province of Qu bec. Findings suggest that a relatively small organization by conventional standards can nonetheless achieve a large influence on criminal markets. We then analyse how factors other than violence play a role in explaining differences in achieving economic influence across criminal organizations. Finally, we suggest that turning our attention to measuring economic influence provides some insights into the duration and intensity of the violent conflicts occurring in these markets.
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