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1 |
ID:
149587
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Publication |
Gurgaon, Penguin Random House India Pvt. Ltd., 2016.
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Description |
ix, 243p.hbk
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Standard Number |
9780670089239
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Copies: C:1/I:1,R:0,Q:0
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Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location | IssuedTo | DueOn |
058925 | 327.54/MEN 058925 | Main | Issued | General | | RF100 | 10-Aug-2023 |
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2 |
ID:
155452
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Publication |
Gurgaon, Penguin Random House India Pvt Ltd, 2017.
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Description |
x, 313p.hbk
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Standard Number |
9780670089437
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
059212 | 355.02/MAC 059212 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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3 |
ID:
100226
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4 |
ID:
097973
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5 |
ID:
146619
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Contents |
The Kargil Conflict had fortuitously brought to the centre-stage the need for an integrated approach towards intelligence gathering and joint operations. The 26//11 Mumbai attack has woken us to the reality of a unified approach between the states, the Coast Guard and the Indian Navy. The Defence Procurement Procedures over the years have tried to bring transparency into our procurement process and there have been some moves towards increasing private sector participation in defence manufacturing. However, unlike automotives and telecom sector, the relationship between the DPSUs, the DRDO and the private sector remain uneasy and adversarial. The DPSUs still do not consider the private sector as partners but as contractors.The record of private sector players such as L&T in strategic programmes like that of Arihant is salutary. A defence capability improvement would need major structural change.Either we have a DGA-like structure or the COCO structure of the USA with the government providing oversight on strategic issues.
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6 |
ID:
129736
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7 |
ID:
095816
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Publication |
2010.
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Summary/Abstract |
The Mumbai attacks have become a symbol of modern terrorism. The gunmen's improvisation, technological superiority and connection to the outside world meant the siege at eight different locations lasted sixty hours. Crucially, the fidayeen had no expectation of survival. The lessons of Mumbai need to be urgently understood before this kind of attack becomes the template for future acts of terrorism.
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8 |
ID:
103168
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9 |
ID:
087618
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
India has demonstrated restraint and maturity in wake of bothe the Parliament and the Mumbai attacks. It has not allowed the calibration of its policy to be hijacked by war hysteria.
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10 |
ID:
089623
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Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2009.
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Description |
x, 22p.
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Standard Number |
9788182744028
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
054255 | 303.62554/JOH 054255 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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11 |
ID:
146758
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12 |
ID:
092674
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13 |
ID:
132267
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Publication |
2014.
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Summary/Abstract |
The government should speed up its project of integrating India's coastline into one radar network The horrific terror attack on Mumbai on 26 November 2008 exposed the vulnerability of the Indian continent via the sea route. Immediately after, the ministry of home affairs (MHA) planned to integrate the entire coastline into one radar network which can seamlessly monitor movements in the sea. The government entrusted Bharat Electronics Limited (BEL) with the responsibility of establishing a chain of 46 static radar sensors along the coastline in Phase-I of the project. Out of these, 36 were planned to be implemented on the mainland while the remaining 10 were to be set up on the islands. As of August 2013, BEL's project was able to activate only 34 radar stations on the mainland.
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14 |
ID:
087617
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
Mumbai terror attacks were engineered from Pakistan at a time when the democratic government had become more aggressive in asserting its legitimate role in the affairs of the state.
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15 |
ID:
093835
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16 |
ID:
102131
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17 |
ID:
091262
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Publication |
2009.
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Summary/Abstract |
Littoral security has been an issue among Indian national security planners and the government established the Indian Coast Guard in 1976. Maritime asymmetric challenges and threats require a sophisticated strategy that pivots on domain awareness and effective translation of intelligence into credible response action. Coordinated operations and sharing of intelligence among the maritime security agencies would help an efficient response mechanism to counter threats to littoral security. In essense, proactive systematic-organisational-operational initiatives hold the key to enhanced domain awareness and credible response to maritime threats.
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18 |
ID:
092454
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19 |
ID:
106893
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20 |
ID:
159707
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Publication |
New Delhi, Wisdom Tree, 2018.
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Description |
xviii, 245p.hbk
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Standard Number |
9788183285247
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
059420 | 327.1747/MEN 059420 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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