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ID:
131790
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A substantial body of literature argues that government funding motivated by the Cold War shaped (or distorted) the content of the American academic disciplines. This article tests the impact of such funding on the academic study of the Soviet economy, a small field created to help fight the Cold War. It documents the amount of attention given by researchers to the military sector of the Soviet economy, the topic of central importance for the Cold War, and finds that their publications largely ignored it. Considerations other than the interests of the sponsors determined the choice of topics in the discipline.
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| 2 |
ID:
048578
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| Publication |
Armonk, M E Sharpe, 1998.
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| Description |
xxiv, 326p.
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| Standard Number |
0765602636
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 040282 | 338.947/ELL 040282 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 3 |
ID:
091595
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The predominant view in the literature holds that the main objective of the Soviet rulers was growth of the official measure of aggregate output, irrespective of its use structure, that is, growth for its own sake. We show that the pursuit of this objective would have been irrational, and argue instead that the main objective was the pursuit of military might. This formulation returns the Soviet rulers to the company of rational economic actors, helps explain the main characteristics of the Soviet economic development better than the majority view, and provides a different perspective on the system's final decades.
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