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| 1 |
ID:
087689
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article makes a case for rethinking traditional approaches to the study of legislative behaviour on behalf of women by asking (1) not when women make a difference, but how the substantive representation of women occurs; and (2) not what 'women' do, but what specific actors do. The first shift aims to explore the contexts, identities and attitudes that motivate and inform substantive representation. The second seeks to move beyond a focus on female legislators to identify the 'critical actors', male and female, who may attempt to represent women as a group. In so doing, this framework calls attention to how structure and agency interact in the substantive representation of women.
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| 2 |
ID:
111506
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
To hold their Members of Parliament individually accountable for their legislative behaviour, British voters would need to base their decision to vote for an MP at least partially on the extent to which the MP's legislative voting behaviour deviated from that of the MP's party leadership. Voters should evaluate this deviation contingent on their views of the party leadership. MP rebellion can signal that voter-MP congruence is greater than that of the voter and the MP's party leadership. In this article it is found that only constituents with negative attitudes toward the Labour government reward rebellious Labour MPs, albeit to a limited extent. A similar conditional association is not observed on a single issue: Iraq. The policy accountability of MPs is relatively weak and general rather than issue-specific.
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| 3 |
ID:
093717
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Until the 2007 Duma election, the Russian polity displayed several characteristics that should have allowed regional leaders to have an impact on deputies: a federalist system, an electoral system that encouraged regional representation, weak political parties, and regional leaders with electoral resources. Recent research on Russian mixed-member Duma elections argues that governors influenced the election of single-member district deputies. This raises the spectre that governors could have influenced the behaviour of these deputies. Using data from the third post-communist Duma, I demonstrate that single-member district deputies backed by regional leaders in the 1999 Duma election behaved differently from others in two critical areas: parliamentary party choice and support for the presidential legislative agenda. Governor support did not, however, affect committee choice.
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| 4 |
ID:
113306
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is well known that different types of electoral systems create different incentives to cultivate a personal vote and that there may be variation in intra-party competition within an electoral system. This article demonstrates that flexible list systems - where voters can choose to cast a vote for the list as ordered by the party or express preference votes for candidates - create another type of variation in personal vote-seeking incentives within the system. This variation arises because the flexibility of party-in-a-district lists results from voters' actual inclination to use preference votes and the formal weight of preference votes in changing the original list order. Hypotheses are tested which are linked to this logic for the case of Belgium, where party-in-a-district constituencies vary in their use of preference votes and the electoral reform of 2001 adds interesting institutional variation in the formal impact of preference votes on intra-party seat allocation. Since formal rules grant Belgian MPs considerable leeway in terms of bill initiation, personal vote-seeking strategies are inferred by examining the use of legislative activity as signalling tool in the period between 1999 and 2007. The results establish that personal vote-seeking incentives vary with the extent to which voters use preference votes and that this variable interacts with the weight of preference votes as defined by institutional rules. In addition, the article confirms the effect of intra-party competition on personal vote-seeking incentives and illustrates that such incentives can underlie the initiation of private members bills in a European parliamentary system.
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