|
|
|
Sort Order |
|
|
|
Items / Page
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
147721
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
After incurring significant losses during France’s 2013 Operation Serval in Mali, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is back. Mokhtar Belmokhtar has rejoined the group, violent attacks are on the increase, and southern Libya offers elements of the group a new safe-haven. This article takes a long view on AQIM, looking at its objectives and ideology, organizational structure, relationship with the local population and revenue model to determine whether they should be labelled as terrorists, insurgents, or ordinary criminals. The article concludes that AQIM generally follows a strategy of terrorism, while some elements and modus operandi could also be indicative of a strategy of insurgency. AQIM’s primary commanders have a long-standing relationship with the global Al Qaeda movement, are unlikely to be seduced by the Islamic State, and enjoy significant autonomy in conducting their operations. There is, however, little evidence that supports the view that AQIM is a criminal organization behind a religious façade, and its Salafi–jihadist ideology remains a leading determinant.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 2 |
ID:
129120
|
|
|
| 3 |
ID:
111811
|
|
|
| 4 |
ID:
185517
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Algerian leadership was once instrumental in organising and fomenting jihad in North Africa and the Sahel. Alongside leadership decapitations, counter-terrorism crackdowns, and a ‘Sahelian shift’ following the influx of Sahelian members, Algerian influence has since significantly waned. Today, Algerian influence is mainly seen in cautionary tales against extremism and infighting. In contrast, few Algerian jihadists still play a role within the overall hierarchy of al-Qaeda's North African and Sahelian branches. As such, it is ultimately a new generation – a non-Algerian generation – that is leading the jihadist charge in northern Africa and the Sahel. However, although diminished, Algerian leadership remains persistently valuable to al-Qaeda’s senior leadership due to their strategic utilitarian view.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 5 |
ID:
090160
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
On 31 May, the Al-Qaeda franchise claimed its first Western victim in Mali when British tourist Dyer was executed. Captured across the Niger border on 22 January, Dyer had been held in northeast Mali.Given that 37 other Westerners have been ransomed since 2003, his death appeared to be a clear signal that the Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)faction established in Mali were more than just criminal opportunists.The fact that his execution was apparently in response to the UK government refusing to release Jordanian militant cleric Abu Qatada seemed to support this.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 6 |
ID:
172172
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
During the last decade, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) managed to survive despite suffering four major fragmentations. Through the case study of AQIM, the goal of this paper is to contribute theoretically and empirically to the literature on terrorism by explaining the fragmentation of resilient jihadist groups. Two causes of fragmentation are identified: the “preference divergence,” in reference to the works of Shapiro, and the structural organization of power. Furthermore, two notions are presented to refine the theoretical tools of the literature on terrorism: a) the meta-strategy of survival, and b) centralized and deconcentrated power. To explore the group’s history and demonstrate the modularity of AQIM, a triangulation of primary sources, such as internal documents and key interviews, along with the monitoring of the regional press, is utilized. The author concludes this paper by suggesting new avenues for studying the evolution of jihadist groups.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 7 |
ID:
175716
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) appeared on the Algerian landscape in 2007 after the merger between Al Qaeda and the GSPC, with the objective of expanding its existing network in North Africa and the Sahel region. Pressure from security forces in Algeria propelled the group to seek refuge in Mali, where the 2012 conflict provided a safe haven for the group. Opération Serval, launched by the French military in 2013, dealt a severe setback to AQIM, as many of its fighters were killed and others dispersed to other parts of the region. From that period onwards, there has been a reduction in terror attacks and bombings until recently. Yet, an increase in kidnapping of foreigners for ransom coupled with drug trafficking signalled a transformation in the modus operandi of the group. To understand this trend, the article applies the crime-terror paradigm in order to assess the evolution of AQIM from a terror group with political and religious intentions into a group engaged in criminal activities with economic motivations. The article finds that AQIM is a hybrid entity that displays both terrorist and criminal motivations which are determined by the context within which the group finds itself.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 8 |
ID:
096429
|
|
|
| 9 |
ID:
087741
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2009.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghrib (AQIM) was founded in 2007 as the latest offshoot of the global jihad. But it is deeply rooted in a long and complex history of Algerian violence, with the "Afghan" volunteers in the 1980s, the civil war raging in the 1990s, and the more recent crisis of the jihadi networks. Despite all its global rhetoric, AQIM has not fully transcended its local dynamics, between its Kabylia strongholds and its Saharan groups.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 10 |
ID:
164146
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
The debate concerning the Nigerian terrorist Boko Haram is typically simplified across two false dichotomies. First, it is treated as either a local conflict in northeast Nigeria with its epicentre in Borno State or part of a broader conflict in Northwest Africa (and beyond), encompassing northern Cameroon, southern Chad, Niger, and reaching into Libya and Mali. The second dichotomy concerns whether it is animated by local material conditions on the ground, or is part of a broader anti-West jihad. The Boko Haram insurgency is not that simple. It is, rather, a multidimensional conflict and can change overtime.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 11 |
ID:
140529
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
When Barack Obama was elected U.S. president in 2008, the news was greeted with enormous hope in sub-Saharan Africa, as well as among the small coterie of Americans who follow the region closely. This son of a Kenyan father would not only understand the continent better than his predecessors in the White House, the thinking went, but he would also treat it as a strategic priority and direct more resources its way. At the time, it didn’t seem far-fetched to predict that Obama would usher in a new era of improved U.S.-African relations. Even though President George W. Bush had substantially increased aid to Africa, anti-Americanism there had grown under his watch, the result of opposition to his unilateralist foreign policy.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 12 |
ID:
124450
|
|
|
|
|
| Publication |
2013.
|
| Summary/Abstract |
All members of the National Commission for Dialogue and Reconciliation, including its President and Vice-Presidents, officially took office in March and April. There was criticism in some quarters that the selection process for membership had not been transparent and that there had been inadequate inclusion of religious, community and traditional leaders.
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| 13 |
ID:
129325
|
|
|
| 14 |
ID:
141441
|
|
|
|
|
| Summary/Abstract |
Energy continues to serve as the bedrock of modern economies and the main driver of modern society. For Africa, the production and supply of energy resources such as crude oil, natural gas, uranium, coal, biomass, biofuels and other renewables are an important source of employment, rents, taxes, royalties and profits. This sector brings in several tens of billions of dollars of revenue annually. The production and delivery of such resources, however, depend on critical infrastructures such as pipelines, refineries, processing plants, terminals, rigs, electrical energy pylons, substations, pump stations, vessels, and tankers. These infrastructures have been attacked by terrorists, insurgents, vandals and saboteurs, all of whom see them as targets against which to register their grievances and extract concessions from the state. This paper is a chronological account of some of the documented incidents of terrorism, insurgency, kidnapping, destruction, sabotage, and human casualties suffered in the oil and gas sectors in Africa between 1999 and 2012. It is based on data extracted from the databases of the RAND Database of World Terrorism Incidents and the University of Maryland's Global Terrorism Database (GTD).
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|