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| 1 |
ID:
179506
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| Summary/Abstract |
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) seeks not only to equal but also to overtake the US military through seizing the initiative in the ongoing Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Chinese military leaders believe the form of warfare is changing from today’s ‘informatised’ (信息化) warfare to future ‘intelligentised’ (智能化) warfare. The PLA’s approach to leveraging emerging technologies is likely to differ from parallel American initiatives because of its distinct strategic culture, organisational characteristics, and operational requirements. This research examines the evolution of the PLA’s strategic thinking and concepts of operations, seeking to contribute to the military innovation literature by evaluating major theoretical frameworks for the case of China.
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| 2 |
ID:
151426
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| Summary/Abstract |
A key organizational challenge for all modern militaries is instituting an effective command-and-control (C2) structure for joint operations. China has been a relative latecomer to joint operations, with a persistent weakness in joint C2. Reforms launched in early 2016 sought to overcome this challenge by establishing a permanent two-level joint C2 structure. Although not a ‘tipping point’ that will lead ineluctably to stronger operational effectiveness, this reform is nonetheless an important milestone in an evolutionary process towards better PLA joint operations. The result could be added operational challenges for several of China’s neighbors and the United States.
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| 3 |
ID:
145431
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| Summary/Abstract |
Surveying China in 2015, this article focuses on how the Xi leadership dealt with several of the most complex economic and security challenges it faced during the year, in particular: sustaining economic growth; responding to social unrest; confronting environmental problems; managing foreign relations in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea; reforming and modernizing the People’s Liberation Army; and managing cross-Strait relations.
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| 4 |
ID:
154435
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article focuses on the institutional changes that have occurred in the foreign and security policy realm since Xi Jinping became General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in November 2012. The establishment of a National Security Commission (NSC) in November 2013, the power centralization in the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the reorganization of the CCP leadership of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) as well as the major branches of the PLA, the reorganization in March 2013 of the various civilian maritime security agencies and the establishment in December 2013 of a Cybersecurity and Informatization Leading Small Group (LSG) are the most striking organizational reforms introduced by Xi. But other institutional changes have taken place as Xi’s inclination to rely on a larger number of actors and in particular to give his closer political allies a bigger role also in foreign and security policy. These changes have obviously helped concentrate more power in the hands of Xi Jinping and, to some extent, better coordinate domestic and external security objectives and on the whole have well served China’s foreign and security policy’s assertiveness and initiatives. However, these changes have only partly reduced the power fragmentation that has developed extensively under Hu Jintao, and they have not contributed to institutionalizing decision-making processes at the top of the CCP and the state apparatuses. On the contrary, it appears that through these changes Xi has not only created new bureaucratic overlaps and tensions but also, in relying more on his own advisers, fed frustrations and competitions among agencies and officials, in other words, new forms of power fragmentation.
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| 5 |
ID:
178170
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 2014–16 Ebola crisis in West Africa was China’s very first opportunity to demonstrate its willingness and ability to play a meaningful role in addressing public health emergencies of international concern. China’s decision to participate in the international response to the outbreak was part of an ambition to enhance its contribution to Africa’s security in general and health security in particular and to exert more influence on global norms. The specific role played by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), especially its Academy of Military Medical Sciences, in Sierra Leone and Liberia is part of an ongoing effort to increase China’s involvement in international humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations. It was the first time that it sent medical military teams to set up and operate infectious disease hospitals overseas. This participation also underscores the PLA’s crucial role in fighting epidemics overseas as well as at home, as the current COVID-19 pandemic illustrates. The Ebola crisis enables us to explore aspects of the PLA’s overseas missions, some of which are humanitarian and others which generally enhance China’s influence as a great power in Africa and in the world in the context of a growing Sino-US strategic competition.
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| 6 |
ID:
164773
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines the design, implementation and reception of defense education in Chinese universities. Delivered by the People’s Liberation Army since 1985, this program, which aims at cultivating students’ civic awareness through elementary military training, is still ongoing today. Official publications and interviews with students who attended the training suggest that defense education is successful in conveying the authority of the Party-state to China’s new elite youth. The physical component of the training is the added value that is well received by the new generations, by comparison with ideological indoctrination. The Chinese Communist Party’s use of the military to infuse discipline and compliance among a historically volatile section of society highlights the militarist nature of the People’s Republic of China.
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| 7 |
ID:
146437
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| Summary/Abstract |
As the frequency and scope of China’s paramilitary and military presence activities in the East and South China Seas have increased in the last few years, officials and analysts inside and outside China have worried more and more about the potential for military crises erupting between China and other actors. Given the perceived high stakes of many of these potential disputes—they touch on sovereignty, territorial integrity, national dignity, and development resources—some observers are concerned about the risks of escalation to military conflict, whether deliberate or accidental.
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| 8 |
ID:
193260
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines how civil-military relations have changed in China. This is conducted in the context of long-term efforts to make the military more professional and to understand how civilians and soldiers interact today. Current analyses of Chinese civil-military relations have focused on the military's professionalization. However, the recent evaluations do not entirely include the lessons learned from past professionalization phases in the People's Liberation Army's (PLA) history. I focus on the continuity between different events in China's civil and military history by looking at the critical links that made it possible for military professionalization to change what had happened before between the Chinese Communist Party and the PLA. The potential impact of further professionalization of the PLA in contemporary civil-military interactions is also examined.
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| 9 |
ID:
155933
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This article reconstructs the origins, typology and implications of extrajudicial incarceration as a political phenomenon during the Cultural Revolution. It analyses the “cowshed” based on its various founders and functions at different stages of the Cultural Revolution, and argues that the Party committees, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and the revolutionary committees, i.e. the arms of the state, played a role no less significant than student Red Guards in confining and torturing innocent people. The article emphasises that the cowshed was distinct for its pervasive, decentred, arbitrary and spontaneous characteristics; however, the exertion of direct popular justice without formal intermediation in China was an alternative form of state violence through outsourcing the state power.
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| 10 |
ID:
177816
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| Summary/Abstract |
A slew of structural changes to the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) combat capabilities, deterrence as well as military operations other than war (MOOTW) were enacted following the announcement to streamline China’s armed forces in September 2015. Primarily driven by the Chinese military leadership’s desire to resolve longstanding shortcomings in the PLA’s ability to conduct combined arms and joint operations, unprecedented changes in the form of so-called ‘below the neck’ reforms gathered pace since the end of 2016. By focusing on those changes to the PLA’s established service branches as well as ‘new types’ of forces, this brief introduction will provide a summary of the prospects and problems as the Chinese military embarks on its latest endeavour to modernize itself.
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| 11 |
ID:
183840
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| Summary/Abstract |
After decades of military reform, how does the Chinese military justify its persistent role in politics and social life? This mixed-methods study examines the discursive strategies used by military deputies to understand how a semi-professional military speak to its relations to the Party, its own organizational missions and goals, and potential conflicts between them. Computer-assisted text analysis is combined with targeted deep reading to identify and examine latent topics in comments made by military deputies between 2001 and 2017. The findings show that the military deputies simultaneously mobilize a political discourse and a discourse of professionalism. This duality of discourse constitutes a source of legitimacy for the military’s pursuit of corporate interests.
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| 12 |
ID:
160500
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article seeks to explain periodic unrest in China’s Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the years immediately following the Third Plenum. This unrest fractured along ethnic lines between the non-Han and the Han, and in so doing, threatened to unravel Deng Xiaoping’s modernization efforts. Simultaneously, the unrest challenged Beijing’s self-projection as a unitary multiethnic state, and singular Chinese nation. Beijing’s anxiety was evident in its response: memorializing state building on the frontier during the 1940s and 1950s; emphasizing nationalities work; and dispatching veteran revolutionaries to Xinjiang. Foremost amongst them was Wang Zhen (1908–1993), who had led the People’s Liberation Army into Xinjiang in October 1949. During four visits between 1980 and 1982, Wang admonished cadres to love Xinjiang and its people, and to settle contentedly on the frontier. In this article, I argue that in the post-1978 period, unrest in Xinjiang was local resistance to accelerated modernization after the Third Plenum. I also demonstrate how this local resistance to Deng-era modernization led to a deepening of Beijing’s appropriation of the frontier.
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| 13 |
ID:
171977
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| Summary/Abstract |
Xi Jinping’s rise to power has heralded a new foreign policy that is more assertive and uncompromising toward China’s neighbors, the United States, and the rest of the world. This change presents challenges for the United States and Taiwan in particular which must be addressed with a sense of urgency due to Xi Jinping’s ambitious objectives and his firm grip on the levers of power which increase the likelihood that the Communist Party and government of China will seek to achieve them without delay.
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| 14 |
ID:
172772
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| Summary/Abstract |
It has been an unusually busy summer for the ministry of defence (MoD). On the one hand, since early 2020, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), which has been carrying out minor transgressions all along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) from Arunachal Pradesh, Sikkim to Himachal Pradesh and Uttarakhand, firmly stationed itself in eastern and south-eastern Ladakh in April.
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| 15 |
ID:
183462
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| Summary/Abstract |
Following their victory in the Chinese Civil War, the Chinese Communists initiated a nationwide counterinsurgency. In Guangxi, a mountainous province at the China-Vietnam border, anti-communist rebels waged an insurgency from 1949 to 1952, hoping that foreign support and Cold War rivalries could eventually restore the ancien régime. This research investigates the counterinsurgency in Guangxi, one of the more mutinous provinces in post-Civil War China. By situating the Guangxi counterinsurgency in the global context, this article aims to contribute to the discussion of Chinese counterinsurgency strategy, experience and how the People’s Republic’s triumphed over the armed resistance.
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| 16 |
ID:
148217
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Chinese military has embarked on a series of organizational and doctrinal reforms intended to better enable it to fight modern war. Prominent among these reforms is the growing emphasis on space to enable long-range precisions strikes and on counterspace to deny space capabilities to an adversary. The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has officially designated space as a new domain and established an organization to command space forces. With this increased focus on space, the PLA may begin to develop a doctrine to govern the use of space in military operations. The higher priority given to space, especially space control, by the PLA coincides with similar actions by the US military, increasing the possibility of warfare in space and the risks of escalation.
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| 17 |
ID:
087753
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Taiwan may be an internal affair but the domestic public opinion is not invited to participate very much in a debate and a decision-making process that have remained confined to the Chinese Communist Party and the military top leadership and, on purpose, involves a very small number of officials and experts. Conservative and nationalist forces do constrain Beijing's Taiwan policy. And some leaders are tempted to use the Taiwan issue for unrelated domestic or foreign policy purpose. Nevertheless, what is striking is the potential for flexibility in China's Taiwan policy. While Chinese local governments and companies' increasing interests in business-as-usual in the Strait and the unbearable cost of any armed conflict tend to narrow the government's options, concentration of power and the efficiency of the propaganda machine allow it to rather smoothly manage, in particular vis-à-vis the elites' conservative opinion group as well as its own public opinion, this flexibility.
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| 18 |
ID:
135518
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the last few years, China has been making concerted efforts at formulating and implementing a comprehensive strategy aimed at a successful power transition at the global and regional levels. in conjunction with its status as the second largest economy in the world and the largest trading partner with many an advanced country, China has recently been implementing a strategy of comprehensive military transformation to aid its leadership ambitions. Learning from the United States armed forces’ experience in Iraq, Kosovo and Afghanistan, China has been implementing a strategy of “system of system” transformation of its armed forces. This effort, with mixes result, is leading to spirals of tension in the region.
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