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ID:
124084
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article introduces political scientists to scenarios-future counterfactuals-and demonstrates their value in tandem with other methodologies and across a wide range of research questions. The authors describe best practices regarding the scenario method and argue that scenarios contribute to theory building and development, identifying new hypotheses, analyzing data-poor research topics, articulating "world views," setting new research agendas, avoiding cognitive biases, and teaching. The article also establishes the low rate at which scenarios are used in the international relations subfield and situates scenarios in the broader context of political science methods. The conclusion offers two detailed examples of the effective use of scenarios.
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| 2 |
ID:
120290
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Many well-established explanations for war suggest that cyber weapons have a greater chance of being used offensively than other kinds of military technologies. This response article introduces a research agenda for the study of cyber war, and offers an example - principal-agent problems in cyber operations - to demonstrate how rigorous theoretical and empirical work may proceed.
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| 3 |
ID:
087823
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article examines 'Fourth Generation Warfare' (4GW), a theory of how warfare has evolved and is evolving, from the perspective of military history. The author makes three primary claims: 4GW advocates' boxing of history into 'generations' is logically and temporally inconsistent; 4GW authors misuse history by selectively choosing case studies and applying them out of context; and other arguments regarding the current and future character of warfare are more convincing. The author concludes that scholars and policymakers would be well served by considering elements of 4GW, particularly its analysis of insurgency, but that the concept should be subsumed by a broader US grand strategy that retains a strong focus on preparation for conventional warfare.
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| 4 |
ID:
104479
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