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| 1 |
ID:
122075
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| 2 |
ID:
141374
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| 3 |
ID:
180242
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s nine-dash line or U-shape line claim in the South China Sea overlaps with Indonesia’s 200 nautical miles exclusive economic zone (EEZ). There have been several instances where Jakarta and China have entered into skirmishes involving fishing vessels in the Natuna area. The latest encroachment by China into Indonesian Natuna EEZ witnessed a departure of China’s justification for such action when it argued that it has sovereignty over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands and also sovereign rights over relevant waters near the Nansha Islands. Jakarta rejected both the arguments and insisted that under United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) China does not have legal basis to claim either traditional fishing grounds or parts of the Natuna waters and invoked the 2016 UN Arbitral Tribunal’s ruling to back its position. This article examines Indonesia’s response vis-à-vis China and argues that with the rise of nationalism over ownership of the Natunas it is likely to progress into an area of potential conflict between Indonesia and China.
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| 4 |
ID:
142808
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| 5 |
ID:
137980
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| Summary/Abstract |
Brazil's defence industry is growing consistently while the nation strengthens its armed forces with modern equipment, mostly manufactured in-country.
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| 6 |
ID:
144094
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s establishment of its Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) is yet another manifestation on the strenuous development of regional security in East Asia. China by virtue of its so-called lawfare has instrumentalized international air law, the law of the sea, and law on the use force to reinforce its comprehensive security doctrine both on the military as well as economic front. Accordingly, China has advanced is sovereign interests through each of these branches of international law when extending its domestic laws in airspace above its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), affirming its sovereignty over the disputed islands and being prepared to respond to imminent threats. Conversely, opponents of the zone have equally exploited those normative frameworks to defend their geopolitical and strategic interests in East Asia under the veil of the communitarian freedoms of overflight.
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| 7 |
ID:
147977
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| Summary/Abstract |
Dominance of the South China Sea is not merely a territorial issue for China but, more importantly, one which it regards as a major step towards recognition as an unrivalled Asia-Pacific power that can arbitrate on global and regional issues along with the US. Since the 18th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and appointment of Xi Jinping simultaneously to China’s three top posts in November 2012, the world is witness to a new thrust to China’s already assertive foreign policy. Early in Xi Jinping’s term, China launched major, bold, geo-strategic initiatives aimed at expanding China’s diplomatic and economic influence and military power well beyond its frontiers.
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| 8 |
ID:
147975
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| Summary/Abstract |
The OBOR strategy has become China’s major foreign policy goal, Beijing will promote this initiative economically, politically, militarily and culturally over the next eight to ten years. For India, there are lessons from this. New Delhi also benefits from at least reasonable ties with most stakeholders in the New Silk Road, including Iran, where India has invested heavily in the Chabahar Port. But India must also make serious efforts to strengthen its links with Southeast Asia, and for this it must maintain stronger ties with Bangladesh. New Delhi will also need to work towards a manageable relationship with Pakistan, which would not only facilitate pipeline projects like TAPI, but also enable access to Afghanistan and Central Asia.
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| 9 |
ID:
139314
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| 10 |
ID:
169289
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| Summary/Abstract |
While the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC) expressly allocates jurisdiction in regard to several activities that are conducted in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), it does not do so for bunkering and ship-to-ship (STS) oil transfers. This article sheds light on different types of bunkering operations, as well as on the often-overlooked practice of STS oil transfers. It suggests that in the case of bunkering, the allocation of jurisdiction as between coastal and flag states depends on the activity of the vessel being bunkered. In the case of STS oil transfers, it concludes that jurisdictional competence needs to be determined in line with Article 59 of the LOSC. The article also examines relevant state practice and contends that the LOSC’s ambiguity is no license to unfettered coastal state regulation.
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| 11 |
ID:
096313
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| 12 |
ID:
137824
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| Summary/Abstract |
It is axiomatic to state that India, as a sovereign independent nation, desires to use the seas for its own purposes while simultaneously preventing others from using them in ways that are to its disadvantage. The ‘ability’ to attain these twin objectives is what is known as ‘maritime power’, which comprises political, economic and military components.
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| 13 |
ID:
142806
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| 14 |
ID:
142805
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| 15 |
ID:
143686
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the most controversial issues during the UN Conference on the Law of the
Sea was to determine the legal status of the EEZ. The first view envisaged the
zone as an extension of the territorial sea, where the coastal states would enjoy
sovereignty with certain exceptions. The second view considered the zone to have
the high seas status with certain modifications. The third view held that the EEZ
was a sui generis zone with its own legal status. The first view was presented
by several Latin American states. The second view reflected the concerns of
Maritime Powers.
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| 16 |
ID:
157793
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| Summary/Abstract |
India’s relations with its neighbours in the maritime domain have received less scholarly attention. Those studies that deal with India’s relations with its South Asian neighbours generally touch on political security, socio-cultural and economic issues. The maritime aspect is either ignored or tucked in as a part of other dimensions. The present study attempts to fill the gap in the literature by taking up the case of Sri Lanka. Sri Lanka is chosen as a case, not only because the island state is India’s closest maritime neighbour but also due to the existence of deep interactions between the two countries in diverse fields both at governmental and non-governmental levels. In the maritime domain, in the present context, technically speaking, there is no problem between the two countries. However, the fishermen issue remains one of the issues principally because of the Tamil Nadu factor. Analysing the issue in five phases, the study argues for a ‘comprehensive approach’ for its settlement.1
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| 17 |
ID:
119128
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| 18 |
ID:
127102
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| 19 |
ID:
122074
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| 20 |
ID:
147986
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| Summary/Abstract |
India, while clinching on its rechristened Look East Policy, must act towards evolving a regional bonding of greater Asia as a regional bulwark against the backdrop of mounting tensions in the Indo-Pacific region due to rising Chinese expansionist assertions based on bullying tactics of its awesome military power, accompanied by economic allurements under its silk road initiative in Central Asia and string of pearls scheme in littoral regions of Indian Ocean and adjoining areas with ultimate purpose of establishing its hegemony all over the world. In this scenario, India needs to strengthen its strategic relations with all the littoral countries around its maritime zone and beyond to include all Southeast Asian nations, Persian-gulf, West Asia and African continent so as to strengthen and consolidate its maritime diplomacy and consequent naval strategy.
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