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| 1 |
ID:
113812
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Over recent decades a judicialization process of international dispute settlement procedures has taken place. Yet, the judicialization of procedures remains meaningless if the procedures are not used and accepted by disputing states in practice. Prominent theoretical approaches point to different conditions under which this is to be expected. Realism emphasizes the international distribution of power, institutionalism stresses the importance of the institutional design of international dispute settlement procedures, and liberalism points to the domestic institutional setting of the participating states. The article confronts these theoretical expectations with states' actual dispute settlement behavior in the international trade regime, the United Nations Security Council, the European human rights regime and the regime on the protection of endangered species in the 1970s/80s and 1990s/2000s, respectively. Its main finding is that, compared to realism and liberalism, institutionalism fares better in explaining the judicialization of states' dispute settlement behavior.
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| 2 |
ID:
113809
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2012.
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Drawing on the work of cultural anthropologists Clifford Geertz and Marshall Sahlins, I suggest a layered conceptualization of diplomacy as consisting of myths, sociabilities and practices which allows us to open the question of diplomacy's Euro-centrism to empirical scrutiny. As do all known diplomatic systems, European diplomacy has its roots in the social systems of kinship and religion. It is rooted in Christian mythology, and this mythology informs its sociabilities and practices. Three mini-case studies (of diplomatic immunity, permanent representation and the institution of dean of the corps diplomatique) demonstrate that this mythology shines through in present-day diplomacy as well. Since diplomatic practices bear the mark of a European cultural context, it privileges the life chances of those native to that context. In this sense, diplomacy is Euro-centric. I then go on to argue that, empirically, this does not seem to be a particularly pressing problem. The real problem may be external to diplomacy itself, and concern the idea that European diplomacy was uniquely peaceful. As I demonstrate by means of a mini-study of Iroquois diplomacy, this is simply not the case. If the erroneous idea of uniquely peaceful European diplomacy is paired up with a framing of relations between European and non-European polities in terms of peaceful diplomacy, the result may easily be that we occlude other aspects of those relations, such as conquest and colonialization. The Euro-centrism of diplomacy that matters is thus less to do with diplomatic practices than with mnemonic practices about diplomacy.
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| 3 |
ID:
110826
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article challenges the optimism common to liberal IR and IL scholarship on the 'rule of law' in global governance. It argues that the concept of the 'rule of law' is often employed with sparse inquiry into the politics of its practical meaning. Specifically, the article focuses on liberal research that advocates the emergence of a 'global' judiciary, and the claim that judicial governance will marginalize state power and authority. Rather than employ a zero-sum conception of power, this article regards a prospective global legal system less as a constraint on state power and more as a rationale for rule 'through' law by vested actors. To make the argument, Michel Foucault's concept of 'governmentality' is combined with Barnett and Duvall's notion of 'productive power' to denote how legal techniques of power are integral to the construction of social 'truth' and consequently the governance of conduct. This is further associated with Koskenniemi's critical scholarship on the power of law's perceived objectivity and universality. In this vein, the article questions how liberal scholars use the American judicial model (the Marbury ideal) to claim that an institutionalization of 'global' judicial authority can deliver the rule of 'no one' in global governance. A governmentality perspective is then applied which suggests that the lack of supreme constitutional rules at the global level makes judicial governance less a check than a means to propagate normative standards conducive to dominant state power.
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| 4 |
ID:
129653
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2014.
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Soft power-based on intangible indicators such as culture, civilization, literature, philosophy, involvement in global institutions, diplomacy, political organization, and state capacity-has emerged as an important factor in the globalizing world for nations seeking higher status and influence. But an appraisal of India's present and putative soft power assets underscores the need for greater hard power resources in order to harness soft power more effectively. Indeed, soft power without hard power is a chimera, and they should not be seen in oppositional terms, especially for an aspiring global power. Hard power sources include military, economic, demographic, and technological assets. As defined by Harvard's Joseph S. Nye Jr. in his 2004 book Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, soft power "is the ability to get what you want through attraction rather than coercion or payments. It arises from the attractiveness of a country's culture, political ideals, and policies. When our policies are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others, our soft power is enhanced." Yet a country relying solely on soft power without hard power assets can find its weaknesses exposed easily. This happened to India in 1962, when China inflicted a humiliating military defeat on it, tarnishing New Delhi's hard-won soft power position in the world, especially among other de.
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| 5 |
ID:
115951
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2013.
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The United Kingdom (UK) is keen on establishing a 'stronger, wider and deeper' relationship with India. It is 'determined to make' defence cooperation 'an essential part' of this relationship. London sees such a relationship with an India that will shape the twenty-first century as 'an essential pillar' in its 'broader strategy' to fashion a role for itself in Asia.
But how important is the UK for India's role in the emerging Asian landscape? Not very, it appears, from de rigueur statements about sharing 'the same vision for a renewed and enhanced partnership' and working together to address 'the challenges of global poverty and development, reform of global institutions, terrorism and climate change' as well as from appeals for a 'better appreciation of each other's core concerns including on the security environment' and particularly the challenge of terrorism.
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| 6 |
ID:
110829
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2012.
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The diffusion of international norms and their effects on policy and political behaviour are central research questions in international relations. Informed by constructivism, prevailing models are marked by a crucial tension between a static view of norm content and a dynamic picture of norm adoption and implementation. Observing that norms continue to evolve after they emerge, we argue that a discursive approach offers a more promising way forward for theorizing and analysing the life cycles of international norms. We present a view of norms as processes, calling attention to both 'internal' and 'external' sources of dynamism. We illustrate this theory by tracing and comparing the life cycles of two global equality norms: gender-balanced decision-making and gender mainstreaming. We find that these norms emerged from two distinct policy realms, and after briefly converging in the mid-1990s, have since developed largely separately from, and often in tension with, one another.
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| 7 |
ID:
131066
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides a response to Brantly Womack's article in this issue on a multinodal view of the global world and China's rise within it. Has globalization ushered in a new and stable structural system based on connectivity and multinodal networks?
I argue here that globalization may be more fragile and beset with system-level risk than in Womack's view. Its future depends on investment in global institutions and global governance by states and networks of private and sub-state actors. Likewise, states may increasingly be caught in networks of interconnections and dependency, while at the same time they must deal with great social forces and struggles that could yet break key links in the system. In sum, agency, political leadership, and institutions matter. The system is dynamic and interactive. It is vulnerable and dependent on active coordination. Even China's trajectory within this system can take very different paths, based on the political choices of its leaders and other players.
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| 8 |
ID:
117053
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although there has been a significant growth in the literature on the ethics of international politics in recent years, much of this has focused on the normative structure of international relations and has downplayed the role of individuals in constituting the understandings and actions in this practice. However, individual agency and accountability are apparent in recent world events. Meanwhile, developments in moral philosophy have increasingly led scholars to re-examine the role that individual character traits - virtues - have in affecting how norms are selected and operationalized. Building on these insights, I argue here that a fully realized appreciation of the morality of international politics requires us to consider what character traits - virtues - its individual participants are expected to exhibit to support and realize its norms. To do so, I begin by outlining how the virtues are deemed to underpin ethical practice and highlight two forms of analysis that may be used to explore this: decision-oriented virtue ethics and constitutive virtue ethics. I then suggest that these can be used to analyse the ethical foundations of international society. Specifically, I adopt a constitutive virtue ethics approach to show how the virtues help to constitute international society using the case study of the establishment of the International Criminal Court. In the process, I aim to highlight both the extent to which the virtues are a feature of the rhetoric of global politics, and - more importantly - how they play a significant role in normative practice.
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| 9 |
ID:
087931
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
By now arguments about the varieties of international order abound in International Relations. These disputes include arguments about the security mechanisms, institutions, and practices that sustain international orders, including balance of power and alliances, hegemony, security regimes based on regional or global institutions, public, private, and hybrid security networks, as well as different kinds of security communities. The way these orders coexist across time and space, however, has not been adequately theorised. In this article we seek to show (A) that, while analytically and normatively distinct, radically different orders, and in particular the security systems of governance on which they are based (such as balance of power and security community), often coexist or overlap in political discourse and practice. (B) We will attempt to demonstrate that the overlap of security governance systems may have important theoretical and empirical consequences: First, theoretically our argument sees 'balance of power' and 'security community' not only as analytically distinct structures of security orders, but focuses on them specifically as mechanisms based on a distinct mixture of practices. Second, this move opens up the possibility of a complex (perhaps, as John Ruggie called it, a 'multiperspectival') vision of regional security governance. Third, our argument may be able to inform new empirical research on the overlap of several security governance systems and the practices on which they are based. Finally, our argument can affect how we think about the boundaries of regions: Beyond the traditional geographical/geopolitical notion of regional boundaries and the social or cognitive notion of boundaries defined with reference to identity, our focus on overlapping mechanisms conceives of a 'practical' notion of boundaries according to which regions' boundaries are determined by the practices that constitute regions
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