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ID:
087986
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
North Korea contributes to instability in the Middle East and South Asia through its proliferation of missiles and other weapons systems used as delivery platforms for chemical (and the production of chemical munitions) or biological weapons, including long-range artillery. Evidence also shows that North Korea has collaborated in the nuclear programs of Syria, Iran, Libya, and Pakistan and has provided weapons and training to terrorist groups in both the Middle East and South Asia (Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers). Given the recent decision by Washington to take Pyongyang off of the list of State Sponsors of Terrorism, the recent and ongoing activity by North Korea directly related to proliferation of WMD and the support of terrorist groups could lead to severe foreign policy challenges for the United States and its allies in the future.
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| 2 |
ID:
140517
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| Summary/Abstract |
North Korea and Syria have a long history of military cooperation. Most of this cooperation has been in the form of North Korean proliferation of weapons, training, assistance, and advisors. North Korea has assisted Syria in at least two forms of WMD—a chemical weapons program, and a plutonium nuclear weaponization program. While both of these programs have been largely destroyed, Syria will likely rebuild its chemical weapons program with North Korean assistance if not deterred by the international community. Conventional weapons are also an international security issue, as North Korea has proliferated a large number of weapons systems that have been used in the Syrian civil war by the Syrian army and Hezbollah fighters. North Korea has been a vital supporter of the Assad regime’s military throughout the Syrian civil war. Korean analysts should take note of how chemical weapons were used in the Syrian civil war because this is likely going to be a test-bed for future North Korean actions in a conflict with the South.
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| 3 |
ID:
108528
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
North Korea has shown no willingness to give up its nuclear weaponization programs. In fact, Pyongyang has gone out of its way to keep essential elements of its
nuclear programs hidden unless it was in the DPRK's interest to publicly display
them. With the increase in tensions initiated by North Korea in recent years this is
particularly disturbing. A review of North Korea's nuclear weapons capabilities
reveals a two-track agenda consisting of both a plutonium (proven) and a highly
enriched uranium (likely) program. Scenarios involving both of these programs
show that North Korea-despite rather primitive capabilities-can deliver a nuclear
weapon that would cause casualties in the tens of thousands. While a preemptive
strike may seem like the obvious answer to a nuclear attack, North Korea's ability
to strike back with non-nuclear forces would likely mean a full-scale conflict possibly involving hundreds of thousands of casualties. Consequence management
for a nuclear attack would be unable to prevent second- and third-order effects
that could last as long as a generation. High-level officials in Washington and
Seoul have placed renewed focus on planning for nuclear scenarios on the Korean
peninsula-but the bottom line is that preventing and deterring a North Korean
nuclear attack must be a high priority.
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