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| 1 |
ID:
144333
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| Summary/Abstract |
In a military intervention, do surges work? I compare the failed ‘surge’ in Vietnam, the repulse of the Easter Invasion in 1972, as a means of assessing the more ambiguous surges in Iraq and Afghanistan. I identify four features of a surge for this analysis: the military dimensions and strategy of the surging forces, the military capabilities of the host forces, the political vitality and will of the host country, and the political commitment in the domestic politics of the intervener. I find that the last feature is the most critical; and, in all three surges, the American political commitment was lacking.
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| 2 |
ID:
089984
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article assesses the scope and nature of the current terrorist threat to the United States and suggests a strategy to counter it. Al-Qaeda continues to pose the most serious terrorist threat to the U.S. today. If the September 11, 2001 attacks have taught us anything, it is that al-Qaeda is most dangerous when it has a sanctuary or safe haven from which to plan and plot attacks. Al-Qaeda has acquired such a sanctuary in Pakistan's Federal Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and its North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and surrounding environs. Accordingly, the highest priority for the new American presidential administration must be to refocus our-and our allies'-attention on Afghanistan and Pakistan, where al-Qaeda began to collapse after 2001, but has now re-grouped. This will entail understanding that al-Qaeda and its local militant jihadi allies cannot be defeated by military means alone. Success will require a dual strategy of systematically destroying and weakening enemy capabilities-that is, continuing to kill and capture al-Qaeda commanders and operatives-along with breaking the cycle of terrorist recruitment among radicalized "bunches of guys" as well as more effectively countering al-Qaeda's effective information operations. The U.S. thus requires a strategy that harnesses the overwhelming kinetic force of the American military as part of a comprehensive vision to transform other, non-kinetic instruments of national power in order to deal more effectively with irregular and unconventional threats. This article first discusses the scope and details of the terrorist threat today and then proposes a counterterrorism strategy for the new presidential administration. It focuses first on creating a micro approach to address the deteriorating situation in both Afghanistan and Pakistan. It then considers the requirements of a broader macro strategy to counter terrorism and insurgency.
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| 3 |
ID:
091891
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Islamist insurgent group, the Abu Sayyaf Group, has proven its ability to inflict significant losses on the Philippine military in recent attacks. Gorden Arthur examines the army's operations aimed at dismantling the rebel group and undermining its civilian support.
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| 4 |
ID:
093231
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The demands of counter-insurgency have sparked much discussion about the need for army reform. But it is also the case that government, as a whole, must adapt to the present campaign. Britain has lagged behind the US in this regard, and it is not clear that sufficient political will exists in the UK for real change. However, British capacity is only ever the first step: ultimately, what matters for successful stabilisation is the capability and legitimacy of the host government.
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| 5 |
ID:
141540
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| Edition |
1st Indian ed.
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Viva Books, 2015.
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| Description |
xiii, 176p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9788130930206
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058327 | 958.1046/GEN 058327 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 6 |
ID:
094508
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| 7 |
ID:
107147
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The overarching Western objective in Afghanistan should be to prevent that country from becoming not just a haven for transnational terrorists, but a terrorist ally as well. That was the situation prior to 9/11 and it would be so again if the Taliban returned to power with al-Qaeda backing. NATO can prevent this indefinitely as long as it is willing to commit significant military and economic resources to a counter-insurgency effort. It cannot eliminate the threat, however, as long as the Afghan insurgents enjoy sanctuary in and support from Pakistan. Alternatively, this objective could be achieved if the Taliban could be persuaded to cut its ties to al-Qaeda and end its insurgency in exchange for some role in Afghan governance short of total control.
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| 8 |
ID:
134170
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2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 1989 the Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Afghanistan leaving the embattled Afghan Communist government of President Mohammad Najibullah to fight against an emboldened mujahideen insurgency. Most experts expected a quick mujahideen victory once the Soviets were no longer directly involved in counterinsurgency operations in support of the Afghan government. But in the spring of 1989 the Afghan Communists beat the odds and defeated a mujahideen rebel offensive designed to capture the eastern city of Jalalabad. This proved to be a turning point, and for the next three years the Najibullah regime held out against the mujahideen 'freedom fighters'. In fact the Afghan Communist regime actually outlasted its sponsor the Soviet Union. The reasons for this remarkable achievement can be traced, in part, to ethnic-tribal divisions among the quarreling mujahideen parties and the Afghan government's ability to exploit them. This largely untold story has obvious implications for understanding the future of post-Karzai Afghanistan, tribalism, ethnicity, and foreign sponsorship in post-US Afghanistan. This article will explore the reasons for the resilience of the Najibullah Communist government and then assess possible implications for a post-2014 Afghan government.
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| 9 |
ID:
130198
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Uncertainties about the 2014 security, political, and economic transitions pervaded Afghanistan in 2013. The failure in 2013 to sign a U.S.-Afghan security agreement permitting the presence of U.S. troops after 2014 deepens those anxieties. As ISAF forces continued to withdraw from Afghanistan, Afghan security forces now have primary responsibility for Afghanistan's security but still face critical challenges and an undefeated Taliban. Peace negotiations have been stalled. Politics were dominated by the upcoming 2014 presidential election that can renew the legitimacy of the existing political system or throw the country into turmoil.
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| 10 |
ID:
103109
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| 11 |
ID:
109488
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The use of force in asymmetrical warfare, and in counterinsurgency operations in particular, has been written off as strategically dangerous and politically irrational. The goal of the article is to examine the role of force in a modern military context and determine if victory through its application is theoretically feasible. This hypothesis will be tested against the backdrop of the conflict in Chechnya. The work will examine the Russian military and public policy as a subordinate subject to the overall inquiry of the article in an attempt to show that force was one of the major factors behind Russian military success in 2001.
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| 12 |
ID:
106607
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Recent discussions among U.S. officials about how the intelligence community can demonstrate its "relevance" to counterinsurgency have been dominated by an ideology that presupposes large-scale military intervention, and in which the role of intelligence is limited to improving analysis in support of current military activities, with little debate of future requirements. This article will highlight a number of alternative conceptions of intelligence "relevance" to counterinsurgency, based on a study of several historical and contemporary U.S. and non-U.S. cases, and by applying a wider definition of counterinsurgency that includes cases where the military plays a subordinate role relative to the intelligence services.
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| 13 |
ID:
119317
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| 14 |
ID:
096512
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| 15 |
ID:
106064
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| 16 |
ID:
123600
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Alexander the Great campaigned successfully for twelve years, across the range of military operations, against a wide range of opponents, and within many varied geographical environments. This article argues that this remarkable record of success can be partially attributed to Alexander's ability to adapt at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Alexander was also capable of operating beyond the bounds of his cultural normative framework. After a brief discussion of Macedonian warfare, this article analyses Alexander's art of adaptation through the exploration of important strategic moments. These moments are his operations in the Balkans, defeat of the Persian navy, counterinsurgency in central Asia and the battle of Hydaspes.
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| 17 |
ID:
153617
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| Summary/Abstract |
Although the concept of legitimacy is central to Western counterinsurgency theory, most discourse in this area black-boxes the concept. It hence remains under-specified in many discussions of counterinsurgency. Fortunately, recent research on rebel governance and legitimacy contributes to our understanding of the problems faced by counterinsurgents who want to boost state legitimacy while undermining that of the rebels. Taken together, this research illustrates that a rational choice approach to legitimacy is simplistic; that micro-level factors ultimately drive legitimacy dynamics; and that both cooption of existing legitimate local elites and their replacement from the top–down is unlikely to succeed. Western counterinsurgency doctrine has failed to grasp the difficulties this poses for it.
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| 18 |
ID:
067863
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| Publication |
Westport, Praeger Security International, 2005.
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| Description |
xiii, 183p.
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| Standard Number |
0275981363
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 050811 | 355.0218/FOW 050811 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 19 |
ID:
117110
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| 20 |
ID:
080247
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2008.
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| Description |
xvi, 233p.
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| Standard Number |
9780275996352
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 053080 | 355.42/LOW 053080 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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