| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that scientific and critical realism have embraced several mistaken claims, among them that social science enquiry cannot proceed unless the theoretical objects of study are specified in advance. The article argues, rather, that although pre-scientific, observable objects and events must be specified from the outset, theoretical objects come to our attention only in the course of formulating theories. The article advances an alternative to scientific realist and critical realist foundations, namely, causal conventionalism, which is an adaptation to the social sciences of several elements of Pierre Duhem's conventionalist account of physical science. The article argues that major goals of theorising that scientific realism and critical realism seek to fulfill are better satisfied by the conventionalist alternative. In an effort to clarify some important issues, the article identifies and responds to a series of related criticisms of my views offered by Colin Wight in his recent article 'A Manifesto for Scientific Realism in IR: Assuming the Can-Opener Won't Work!' in 'Millennium', and in his book, Agents, Structures and International Relations: Politics as Ontology.
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