| Srl | Item |
| 1 |
ID:
141033
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| Edition |
1st ed.
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| Publication |
New Delhi, Pentagon Press, 2015.
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| Description |
xii, 316p.hbk
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| Standard Number |
9788182748408
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Copies: C:2/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 058312 | 355.03/PHA 058312 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
| 058313 | 355.03/PHA 058313 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 2 |
ID:
139184
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| Summary/Abstract |
The 1965 Indo-Pak War came when India was in the midst of a major military expansion. India did not want to escalate matters when Pakistani forces invaded Kutch in April 1965 and accepted a ceasefire with British mediation. Although the government allowed the use of Indian Air Force (IAF) combat aircraft on 1 September 1965, action remained localised to the Chhamb area for five days. This was primarily because of India’s desire to avoid all-out war. IAF was used for counter air, air defence, and in support of the ground forces. Poor communications with the Army, lack of joint planning, an almost total absence of early warning and ground controlled interception (GCI) radars meant that its overall performance was sub-optimal. Despite these self-imposed restraints, India succeeded in thwarting Pakistan’s efforts to grab Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) by force, and to that extent the war did become a limited victory for India.
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| 3 |
ID:
110170
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| 4 |
ID:
098049
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| 5 |
ID:
053864
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| Publication |
Stanford, CISAC, 2002.
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| Description |
28p.
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| Series |
Stanford University working paper
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 045554 | 355.00951/PHA 045554 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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