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ID:
093562
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the potential impact of U.S. disarmament leadership on the nuclear diplomacy of North Korea and Iran, the "defiant states." The first part of the article introduces the concept of "interaction capacity," which measures a state's integration into international society, based on its physical communication systems and its adoption of shared norms. The theory predicts that lower levels of interaction capacity will generate a greater propensity for nuclear defiance, as the affected states reject and try to resist integration pressures. In the second and third parts of the article, this conceptual framework is applied to the cases of North Korea and Iran. The analysis suggests that efforts to reassert U.S. disarmament leadership could increase the alienation of North Korea and Iran, leading to provocation and escalation of nuclear tensions. The final part of the paper explores the policy implications of this analysis for the potentially defunct six-party talks, for hopes of renewed negotiations with Iran, and for the 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons.
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| 2 |
ID:
088162
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The process of determining noncompliance is an important aspect of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards system, as well as the only established mechanism for determining noncompliance with the nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) itself. Noncompliance with an NPT safeguards agreement constitutes violation of Article III of the NPT, the obligation to accept safeguards on all nuclear material, and, depending on the circumstances, possibly a violation of Article II, the obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons.
In his April 5 speech in Prague, President Barack Obama said one of the needed improvements in the NPT regime is to ensure "immediate consequences for countries caught breaking the rules." Noncompliance is also assuming importance within discussions regarding various fuel-supply assurance schemes. A state would not qualify for assured fuel supply if found in noncompliance with safeguards obligations.
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| 3 |
ID:
182626
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| Summary/Abstract |
Would existing norms be vulnerable to degeneration due to the noncompliance behavior of some members, especially that of norm entrepreneurs? Standard accounts of norm studies focus on the negative influences of norm noncompliance on norm diffusion. This article starts with a critical thinking about norm noncompliance and argues that norm noncompliance, as well as norm compliance, constitutes a normal and necessary part of our social system. It develops hypotheses on why and how norm noncompliance leads to norm diffusion. To illustrate this argument, it takes free trade norms as a case to explore the different attitudes held by the United States, European Union (EU), and China. China has been motivated by US noncompliance behaviors to take the lead in diffusing free trade norms, while the EU tries to prevent China from taking the championship, which combined have promoted the diffusion of free trade norms.
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| 4 |
ID:
140478
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the greatest challenges facing China today is the central government's ability to ensure that policies are implemented effectively at the local level, particularly policies that seek to make China's economic growth model more sustainable. These policies face resistance from local authorities and enterprises that benefit from the status quo. This raises a key research question: why do some provinces more fully implement these central policies? We argue the extent of local implementation is best conceptualized as a rational balance between economic and political incentives: localities with regulatory autonomy, low regulatory capacity and alternative interests will not fully implement policies that are at odds with local economic imperatives. By examining a critical case of central policy implementation—industrial energy intensity reduction in the eleventh five-year plan—this article demonstrates that, regardless of industrial makeup or economic development, provinces that have greater regulatory autonomy for noncompliance coupled with alternative economic interests do not, on average, perform as well. Using a nested analysis approach this study illustrates this argument with both quantitative analysis and original case study evidence from fieldwork interviews.
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| 5 |
ID:
093423
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