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| 1 |
ID:
088499
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| 2 |
ID:
116351
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
India's conventional war doctrine has been extensively discussed over the past decade. It has been dubbed Cold Start, though the term has been dropped from usage recently. The article discusses India's limited-war doctrine in its origin, impetus behind it, tenets, and reasons for the current distancing from the doctrine. The doctrine was India's rekindling of its conventional deterrent in the face of Pakistani subconventional proxy warfare. Its implications in terms of escalation possibilities to the nuclear level attracted considerable attention. Its "quick on the draw" nature added to concerns on crisis stability. These conspired to shift the latest doctrinal movement in India away from default reliance on traditional conventional operations to a proactive strategy that includes in addition punitive military response options.
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| 3 |
ID:
100957
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Cold Start doctrine is an innovative exercise. While Cold Start discusses how to start the campaign, equal thinking needs to attend how to end it. On the conventional level, the learning is that the Cold Start offensives of the integrated battle groups need to be delinked from those of the strike corps. Plausible political aims cannot be visualised that make nuclear risk of launch of strike corps offensives worth running. On the nuclear front, fallout of the scenario considered is on the doctrine of 'massive' nuclear retaliation. This has its limitations in reacting to nuclear strikes of low opprobrium quotient. Moving to 'flexible' nuclear retaliation countenancing ending an exchange at the lowest possible level may be preferable instead. In the nuclear age, utility of military force has reached its limits. The future lies in energising non-military problem solving approaches.
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| 4 |
ID:
128130
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In the wake of the Kargil War, India developed a limited war doctrine. The key elements of this doctrine are that is a proactive and offensive. It is proactive in the sense that while being strategically reactive, for instance to terror provocation emanating from Pakistan, it is proactive at the operational level in choosing the time and place of conventional response and shaping of the battle. It is offensive in terms of its intent of taking the battle to the enemy, fighting on and making gains on enemy territory and its aim plus of punishing the Pakistan military.
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| 5 |
ID:
122927
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
For six years, India has sought to implement an army doctrine for limited war, 'Cold Start', intended to enable a Cold War era force optimised for massive offensives to operate under the nuclear threshold. This article asks whether that is presently feasible, and answers in the negative. Doctrinal change has floundered on five sets of obstacles, many of which are politically rooted and deep-seated, thereby leaving the Army unprepared to respond to challenges in the manner envisioned by the doctrine's architects.
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| 6 |
ID:
171173
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| Summary/Abstract |
In 2019, the geostrategic landscape of South Asia significantly changed. A crisis between India and Pakistan involved air strikes across international boundaries for the first time since the 1971 war. Pakistan came close to economic collapse, while India re-elected hawkish Narendra Modi as prime minister in a landslide. These developments, alongside the United States’ efforts to strike a deal to leave Afghanistan and rapidly improving US-India relations, portend new challenges for Pakistan’s security managers—challenges that nuclear weapons are ill-suited to address. Despite the shifting security and political situation in the region, however, Pakistan’s nuclear posture and doctrine seem unlikely to change. This article explores the roots of Pakistan’s reliance on the traditional predictions of the nuclear revolution, most notably the notion that nuclear-armed states will not go to war with one another, and argues that this reliance on nuclear deterrence is a response both to Pakistan’s security environment and to serious constraints on moving away from nuclear weapons toward an improved conventional force posture. Pakistan’s central problems remain the same as when it first contemplated nuclear weapons: the threat from India, the absence of true allies, a weak state and a weaker economy, and few friends in the international system. While 2019 may have been a turning point for other states in the region, Pakistan is likely to stay the course.
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