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| 1 |
ID:
113501
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| 2 |
ID:
106600
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Italian election of April 1948 represented the first occasion on which the CIA intervened to influence events abroad. Understanding of the operation has been shaped by three dissimilar approaches that have been critical, celebratory, and stressed continuity. These approaches have, in turn, fuelled a series of useful myths around the episode. Agency declarations of greater 'openness' after the Cold War promised to advance historiographical debates on this - and other - interventions through the declassification of records, although proved a false dawn. This article offers an alternative method to analyse the case through a broader international frame of inquiry that considers CIA action in the context of both American and Italian efforts during the election. In so doing, it challenges the useful myths around 1948.
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| 3 |
ID:
119758
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| 4 |
ID:
150417
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| 5 |
ID:
092466
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The UK's domestic intelligence agency, MI5, has become increasingly involved in the realm of law enforcement over the last decade. This article puts the British experience in perspective by comparing it with France's main domestic intelligence agency, which has pushed deep into the law enforcement arena in recent years. A similar perception of Islamist terrorism underpins these parallel developments in the two countries. However, differences relating to accountability, legal systems and conceptions of the state mean that the French intelligence agency has expanded its role considerably more than its British counterpart. The analysis indicates that MI5's move into law enforcement is likely to remain a relatively conservative one.
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| 6 |
ID:
106599
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| 7 |
ID:
171232
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| Summary/Abstract |
In May 2016, Britain’s signals intelligence agency the Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) joined the social media platform Twitter to considerable press fanfare. But to date, no analysis has been undertaken regarding the use and outcomes of social media by the agency - once referred to as Britain's 'most secret'. This article posits that, while the use of social media has allowed the agency to reach out to a new tech-savvy generation, its presence on the platform can sometimes stoke and amplify conspiracy theories affecting issues such as brand identity as GCHQ adopts a new, media friendly approach.
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| 8 |
ID:
102137
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| 9 |
ID:
088576
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) applies a variation of the intelligence cycle - the process of planning, collecting, processing, analysis, and dissemination of information characteristic of intelligence agencies - to mitigate the risk of terrorist attack and respond to national security breaches. The intelligence cycle helps DHS encourage voluntary security measures, serve its customers, and avoid economic disruption, but the Department's program setbacks and failures illustrate the difficulty of applying the intelligence model to the needs of homeland security. The Department's particular means of producing intelligence and information challenge the conventional conception and definitions of the intelligence cycle.
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| 10 |
ID:
106602
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The authors' previous research has established that the 1967 Arab-Israeli Six-Day War resulted from a deliberate Soviet plan to provoke Israel into a pre-emptive strike, which would legitimize and trigger a massive Soviet military intervention to aid an Egyptian-Syrian counteroffensive. However, US documents released until recently provided no evidence that the American intelligence community, and particularly the CIA, detected this threat or informed the political leadership about it - even though some indications were picked up at the field level. A newly declassified, retrospective report appears for the first time to show that there was awareness of major components of the Soviet operation (preparations for a naval landing and parachute drop). But closer scrutiny finds that this report reflects Soviet propaganda more than factual intelligence - thus further tarnishing what has hitherto been held as an outstanding achievement for the Agency and its chief.
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| 11 |
ID:
158763
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| 12 |
ID:
114208
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| 13 |
ID:
108623
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A careful review of the depiction of Soviet atomic espionage provided in Pavel Sudoplatov's Special Tasks and Sacred Secrets by Jerrold and Leona Schecter demonstrates how faulty memories, Soviet intelligence agency disinformation, sloppy citations, misplaced trust in documents provided by unidentified sources under unexplained circumstances, and egregious lapses in logic and judgment can lead to conclusions unsupported by evidence. The accounts of Soviet atomic espionage in both books are neither reliable nor credible. In particular, the assertions that Robert Oppenheimer, Enrico Fermi, and Leo Szilard consciously cooperated with and assisted Soviet atomic intelligence are without credibility.
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| 14 |
ID:
102522
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| 15 |
ID:
171056
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| 16 |
ID:
106603
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Drawing on intelligence documents that were recently declassified, this article assesses the quality of US intelligence analysis during the 1980-81 Polish crisis and the impact of the intelligence analysis on US policy toward Poland and the Soviet Union. After discussing the value and limitations of the declassified materials, the article raises questions about US policy during the crisis and discusses how intelligence inputs helped to shape policy. The newly available documents confirm that the US intelligence community's analytical products were often deficient and that these shortcomings put a crimp on US policymakers' choices.
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| 17 |
ID:
104251
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| 18 |
ID:
132449
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