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| 1 |
ID:
137950
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| Summary/Abstract |
On 14 February 1945, King Abdul-Aziz ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia stepped aboard the USS Quincy, anchored in the Great Bitter Lake in the Suez Canal, to meet the dying American president, Franklin D Roosevelt. Roosevelt was returning from Yalta where, with Joseph Stalin and Winston Churchill, he had decided the fate of the post-war world. Roosevelt and Ibn Saud had a convivial discussion for several hours before going their separate ways.
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| 2 |
ID:
144206
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article traces the history of the Suez Canal since its origins in the 19th century to the present-day. It gives an outline not only of the antecedents of the Canal, but also looks at the August 2015 widening and deepening of the Canal with its effects of the Egyptian economy and international commerce.
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| 3 |
ID:
113116
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The new government in Egypt will have to deal with the following challenges in its foreign policy: the Palestinians, Sinai, the arms race between Israel and Egypt, the nuclear issue, the Suez Canal, and the Tiran Straits. Egypt has to decide what its approach would be toward these issues and as to how to maneuver between its own interests and those of other states such as Israel and the USA. All the sides have to consider their steps carefully in order to avoid an unnecessary crisis.
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| 4 |
ID:
112186
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| 5 |
ID:
177741
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| Summary/Abstract |
In order to pressure Israel to withdraw from the lands it took following the 1956 Suez War, the United States made two key commitments. It promised Israel it would open the Straits of Tiran if Egypt reimposed a blockade and that if the blockade nevertheless persisted, Israel would have the right to act on its own to ensure free passage of Israeli ships. When Nasser closed the Straits in 1967, President Johnson reneged on both commitments. LBJ chose not to act to end the blockade and warned Israel not to act alone. The failure to live up to these commitments contributed to the outbreak of the 1967 War, hampered efforts to get Israel to give up the territories it conquered as a result of the war, and reinforced in Israel the conviction that it could not depend on others for its security. Israel and the Middle East would be very different places today if those commitments had been fulfilled.
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| 6 |
ID:
012507
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| Publication |
April 1997.
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| Description |
57-73
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| 7 |
ID:
185303
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| 8 |
ID:
108756
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| Publication |
London, Pluto Press, 2011.
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| Description |
vii, 208p.
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| Standard Number |
9780745330280
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 056352 | 956.05/AMI 056352 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 9 |
ID:
089283
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
As World War II was drawing to a close in February 1945, U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt and Saudi King Abdul Aziz ibn Saud met aboard a U.S. battleship in the Suez Canal for the first time. For nearly six decades afterward, the United States and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia enjoyed an unusually close relationship. U.S. companies, which had discovered black gold in the Saudi desert in the early 1930s, built the kingdom into the world's leading petroleum exporter and a major source of oil for the U.S. market. The Saudis, in turn, made their territory and military facilities available to U.S. forces in order to assure U.S. protection of the House of Saud.
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| 10 |
ID:
184639
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| 11 |
ID:
109087
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| 12 |
ID:
038738
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| Publication |
London, Martin Secker and Warburg Limited, 1973.
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| Description |
xvi, 399p.Hbk
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| Standard Number |
436240521
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 012828 | 923.262/LAC 012828 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
114370
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| 14 |
ID:
053094
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| 15 |
ID:
111236
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| 16 |
ID:
125072
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The failure of Australian Prime Minister Menzies' mission to Egypt in 1956 and the expulsion of the Australian diplomatic mission from Cairo dominate thinking about Australian Middle East diplomacy during the 1950s. Archival records, particularly in regard to the issue of the Suez Canal base negotiations concluding in 1954 show a predisposition, with occasional racist undertones, on the part of the Menzies government to line up with its British counterpart. Despite changing regional realities, and notwithstanding efforts by Australian officials in Cairo and Canberra to inject greater realism and caution into Australia's stance, Casey gave departmental officials little support. The article underlines the importance in Australian foreign policy of according appropriate weighting to fraternal and alliance-focussed concerns, but also to having the skills and experience required to evaluate the degree to which Australian interests may be affected by events on the ground and the policy choices of our partners.
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| 17 |
ID:
040247
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| Publication |
London, Jonathan Cape, 1978.
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| Description |
xiv, 282p.: ill., maps, figureshbk
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| Standard Number |
022-016601
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 018207 | 962.050924/LLO 018207 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 18 |
ID:
184680
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