| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
In countries with a significant amount of low variable cost generation capacity, the integration of electricity markets poses a real problem with respect to consumers' interests. In such cases, consumers face a significant price rise compared with consumers in countries where low-cost capacities are lacking. This paper analyses this problem both in the short and long term, focusing on a market dominated by nuclear and hydro production. When there are too many restrictions on new capacity developments in low-cost technologies, market integration will lead to surplus redistribution without any production reallocation. This really makes it legitimate to contemplate redistributive compensations towards local consumers in countries which benefited from low variable cost generators at the moment of liberalisation. This paper examines two alternative ways of rent reallocation, one by income with a windfall tax on nuclear producers and the allocation of this revenue to energy efficiency policy funds, and another by price by giving drawing rights on the existing nuclear generators' production to small commercial and domestic consumers, at a level equivalent to the one necessary to maintain regulated prices.
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