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| 1 |
ID:
088997
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study quantifies the impact of increasing ethanol production on wholesale/retail gasoline prices employing pooled regional time-series data from January 1995 to March 2008. We find that the growth in ethanol production kept wholesale gasoline prices $0.14/gallon lower than would otherwise have been the case. The negative impact of ethanol on retail gasoline prices is found to vary considerably across regions. The Midwest region has the biggest impact at $0.28/gallon, while the Rocky Mountain region had the smallest impact at $0.07/gallon. The results also indicate that the ethanol-induced reduction in gasoline prices comes at the expense of refiners' profits. We find a net welfare loss of $0.5 billion from the ethanol support policies in multiple markets.
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| 2 |
ID:
100946
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2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
If trade affects the costs of conflict, does it also influence the likelihood of mediation attempts? This article argues that dense bilateral trade between antagonists yields high opportunity costs since it is expensive to seek alternative markets and the belligerents will be highly vulnerable to sanctions from their counterpart. This creates incentives for combatants to limit hostility and settle conflicts through mediation. By contrast, the extent to which belligerents trade with other states decreases the likelihood of mediation since antagonists with alternative partners can mitigate the consequences of sanctions and substitute for markets, which may be at risk or even lost because of the outbreak of a dispute. The divergent effects of different trade ties imply that the impact of bilateral trade on the prospects for mediation should vary conditional on countries' trade with states outside the dyad and vice versa. This article demonstrates that this is partially valid.
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| 3 |
ID:
114329
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2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
To reduce its consumption of coal and oil in its primary energy consumption, China promotes the development of renewable energy resources. I have analysed the long-term relationship among China's primary energy consumption sources. Changes in coal consumption lead those in the consumption of other energy sources in the long term. Coal and oil fuels substitute for each other equally. The long-term elasticities of China's coal consumption relative to its hydroelectricity consumption were greater than one and nearly equal during the two sample periods. Therefore, increased hydroelectricity consumption did not imply a reduction in coal consumption. China holds abundant hydroelectricity, wind and, solar energy potential. China must prevent an excessive escalation of its economy and resultant energy demand to realise a meaningful substitution of coal with hydroelectricity. Moreover, China must develop and use wind and solar energy sources. Natural gas can be a good substitute for coal, given its moderate price growth and affordable price levels.
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| 4 |
ID:
149858
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study examines the prospect that a consumer-driven market could eventually replace the myriad regulations and demand quotas in the US ethanol and gasoline fuel market. Given efficient households that minimize the cost of operating automobiles, recent vehicle technology that improves blended fuel substitution, and typical market conditions of the last five years, blended fuels with 20% ethanol concentration could occupy a volume of 82.2 billion gallons in a 138.3 billion gallon gasoline market. The consumer welfare gain associated with blended fuel is $15.9 billion annually for US consumers, or about $1000 over the life of a vehicle.
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| 5 |
ID:
173885
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| Summary/Abstract |
Existing research on terrorism as a strategy has largely neglected the apparent differences in what groups target. Whereas some organizations primarily target undefended civilians, others attack mainly official and hard targets. I develop an explanation of terrorist groups’ relative target preferences based on how a group’s ties to its constituency and specific government repressive strategies either constrain or incentivize terrorist attacks against soft civilian vs. hard/official targets. Specific sources of support and the degree of out-group antagonism in their constituency shape terrorist groups’ primary targeting strategy. While groups with transnational support are generally more likely to target primarily undefended civilians, not all groups with local support are restrained. Groups with low out-group antagonism and local civilian support incur high political costs for targeting civilians and focus primarily on official targets. Instead, groups with domestic support but high out-group antagonism have mixed incentives. When facing indiscriminate government repression these groups become more likely to target primarily undefended civilians, because they can justify such a response to their audience, direct attacks against out-group civilians, and radicalize local constituents. Indiscriminate repression, however, does not change the targeting strategy of groups who face high political costs for attacking civilians. I examine the observable implications of the theory in a comparative analysis of terrorist organizations (1995–2007) as well as an over-time analysis of repression and targeting in the Israeli–Palestinian conflict (1987–2004), and find strong support for the theoretical argument.
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| 6 |
ID:
096115
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Previous work on the dynamics of conflicts where we see terrorism has tended to focus on whether we see shifts in attack mode following government countermeasures. We contend that many factors other than counterinsurgency can influence whether groups resort to terrorism, including competition between groups, as well as their relationship to public opinion and other political events. Hence, understanding terrorist tactics in prolonged conflicts with multiple actors requires us to consider a more general framework of innovation, imitation, competition and dependence between actors. We use disaggregated data on terrorist attacks, counterterrorism and public opinion in the Israel-Palestine conflict to jointly evaluate predictions derived from several conventional theories of strategic behaviour. We find that the strategic calculus of Palestinian groups is complex and cannot be treated as time invariant. Our results suggest that factors such as the degree of public support, inter-group competition, the anticipation of countermeasures and non-trivial non-violent payoffs have an observable effect on the strategic behaviour of the Palestinian groups, and that structural relationships are often far from constant over time.
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