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| 1 |
ID:
112336
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Mexico is winning its death match against the drug cartels and rebuilding once-corrupt institutions in the process. But an election is approaching, and the candidates are calling for a truce. Mexico can take its place in the sun, but only if it wipes out the cartels for good.
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| 2 |
ID:
129247
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| 3 |
ID:
192649
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| Summary/Abstract |
This study examines the evolution of drone tactics employed by drug cartels in Mexico from 2017 to 2022. The research traces the increasing sophistication of drone technology, payload capacities, and adaptability of cartels in employing airborne drones in low-intensity conflicts It also highlights the increasing reliance on drones for various purposes. The analysis reveals insights into how criminal organizations adapt to the changing technological landscape, incorporating drones into their operations and creating new challenges for law enforcement. The analysis outlines strategies and identifies specialized measures to counteract this asymmetric warfare.
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| 4 |
ID:
096487
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| 5 |
ID:
129522
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| 6 |
ID:
139010
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article defines and assesses the ideal-type of the radical criminal as the analytical framework for a comparative qualitative study of Mexican religious drug cartels and Australian outlaw motorcycle gangs and concludes that radical criminals operate in both weak and failed states and stable democracies. The article participates in the wider discussion concerning the existence (and the features) of a grey area between criminal and political violence, through the lens of the radical criminal ideal-type.
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| 7 |
ID:
089084
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Brazen assassinations, kidnappings, and intimidation by drug lords conjure up images of Colombia in the early 1990s. Yet today it is Mexico that is engulfed by escalating violence. Over 10,000 drug-related killings have occurred since President Felipe Calderón took office in December 2006; in 2008 alone, there were over 6,000. Drug cartels have begun using guerrilla-style tactics: sending heavily armed battalions to attack police stations and assassinating police officers, government officials, and journalists. And they have also adopted innovative public relations strategies to recruit supporters and intimidate their enemies: displaying narcomantas -- banners hung by drug traffickers -- in public places and uploading videos of gruesome beheadings to YouTube.
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| 8 |
ID:
093823
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This introductory essay provides a strategic overview of the threat posed by the largest Mexican drug cartels (The Federation, Gulf, Jurez, and Tijuana), and affiliated mercenary groups and street and prison gangs, to the United States. Cartel areas of operation in both Mexico and the United States are highlighted along with linkages to affiliated enforcers and gangs such as Los Zetas, the Mexican Mafia (La Eme), and Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13). The illegal economies of these threat groups - ranging from narcotics trafficking through commodities smuggling and theft, extortion and kidnapping, weapons trafficking, and street taxation - is discussed. The trans-operational environments involving US engagement with the Mexican cartels, mercenaries, and their Sureos affiliates is then characterized. Lastly, individual contributions to this work are summarized.
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| 9 |
ID:
112616
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Violence in Mexico related to drug trafficking has expanded enormously, and observers have begun using terms like terrorism, nacro-terrorism, and criminal insurgency to label the violence. However, arguments that Mexico is the victim of growing terrorism are both exaggerated and unconvincing. While there have been many murders of innocent civilians, these killings do not seem to have been motivated by a political, ideological, or religious cause. This analysis seeks to understand the nature of the expanding violence in Mexico. It starts from the premise that the violence is a complex and multi-layered phenomenon with a variety of different rationales and motivations. From this perspective, a pyramidal approach to the violence can be identified. At the base of the pyramid is the notion of drug-related violence as the medium of rational strategic competition in a highly lucrative illicit market. A second layer in the pyramid emphasizes factionalism within the organizations as well as a process of contracting out for much of the violence to youth gangs and specialists. And a third perspective on the violence puts less emphasis on organizations and more on the degeneration of norms and inhibitions.
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| 10 |
ID:
112617
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Drawing from interviews, surveys, and other forms of research conducted in Lebanon, Gaza and the West Bank, and Mexico, this article compares Mexican cartels to Hamas and Hezbollah. The similarities between them are striking: these are all by necessity territorially specific organizations tied to relatively defined geographic locations, and have deep and sophisticated relationships with the states within which they operate. However, there are critical differences between Mexican drug cartels and Hamas and Hezbollah as well, the most important (according to an analysis of multiple definitions of terrorism) being the presence of political and ideological motivations. This analysis illustrates the conceptual challenges and classificational ambiguity involved in analyzing terrorism and organized crime.
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| 11 |
ID:
127195
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