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ID:
148630
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| Summary/Abstract |
By discussing the role of the Balkan Entente within Turkish–Yugoslav relations, this article endeavours to reflect the extent to which the Entente guaranteed security to Turkey and Yugoslavia. It deals with the 1934–41 period, which starts with the formation of the Balkan Entente and ends with the German invasion of Yugoslavia. The article is written mainly based on Yugoslav archival documents and aims to provide an alternative narrative that contests the conventional Turkish view. It also demonstrates that although the political leaders in Turkey and Yugoslavia became more optimistic about the future of the region after having signed the Balkan Entente, their perception of threat changed over time during the period of increasing instability in Europe.
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| 2 |
ID:
174169
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| Summary/Abstract |
The title of this special issue, Britain, Turkey and NATO, 1945–1960 evolved from a workshop organised by the British Institute at Ankara, and Koç University in Istanbul and held at Koç University on 26–27 September 2019. The seventieth anniversary of the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was the stimulus for us to organise the workshop which focuses on Turkish-British relations from the regional as well as global perspective. The articles analyse Turkish-British bilateral relations within the context of the Mediterranean and Middle East regions. They discuss the impact of Turkish-British relations in post-war developments such as the foundation of NATO and the formation of the Baghdad Pact. The role of the two countries in Cyprus is also included.
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| 3 |
ID:
149433
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| Summary/Abstract |
By analyzing Turkey’s relations with Great Britain and the US in a period of drastic change (1929–47), this article argues that the origins of the shift in the orientation of Turkish foreign policy from Pax Britannica to Pax Americana not only affected the perceptions and strategies of relevant powers, but also entailed a dynamic interactive process. It asserts that the transition featured aspects of significant change, as well as continuity for the region. It demonstrates that while attempting to bandwagon with the relatively stronger naval, military, and economic partner, Turkey also endeavored to pursue a more autonomous foreign policy at various stages of this transition.
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| 4 |
ID:
185548
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| Summary/Abstract |
The key puzzle that this article explores is how the Great Powers’ wedging strategies and Turkey’s efforts to balance these powers defined complex strategic alignment dynamics during the 1930s and World War II. We posit that in the 1930s, as Turkey strove to balance the European great powers, these powers resorted to wedging strategies to sway Turkey away from any other sphere of influence. During World War II, increasing US engagement in the region compelled Ankara to utilize a ‘dual balancing strategy’ to preserve its neutrality, by balancing between the Axis and the Allies and between the British and the Americans. Concomitantly, both Allies and Axis powers utilized predominantly reward-wedging strategies to keep Turkey away from the opposing bloc. We assert that in rethinking strategic alignment more emphasis should be placed on the interactive nature of wedging process and the role and motives of agency.
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| 5 |
ID:
108471
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| Publication |
2011.
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This paper studies innovative approaches and challenges to teaching the state required common core course of the history of the Turkish Revolution. The Turkish state believes that teaching the Turkish Revolution to the younger generations helps to spread the ideology of the Turkish Republic. The paper summarizes the history of the course since the foundation of the Turkish Republic and critically discusses its ideological foundations and changes in its methods and premises over time. Teaching a state-required course creates several problems such as lack of student interest and limited exposure to the history of contemporary Turkey. In order to deal with these problems, teaching techniques have been adopted from the New History approach and improved the required curriculum.
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| 6 |
ID:
089119
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper is aimed at introducing the inter-war dimension to the debate on the history of Turkey's association with the idea of European integration. This association evolved in the context of two inter-war initiatives: Aristide Briand's European Union proposal within the framework of the League of Nations and Richard Coudehove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe idea. Although Turkey had been originally excluded from both, the inter-war great power rivalries in Europe rectified the situation, allowing Turkey's incorporation into both schemes. In the process, the Turkish leaders and public could relate to Briand's intergovernmental initiative far more easily than to Coudenhove-Kalergi's Pan-Europe ideal. This might be considered a manifestation of traditional Turkish emphasis on institutional, rather than ideational, aspect of European integration.
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| 7 |
ID:
161195
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article seeks to explain how Britain and Turkey established a partnership in the second half of the 1930s despite the fact that they failed to agree upon a common rival to stand against. The prevailing International Relations literature highlights the existence of a common enemy as an essential component of alliance formation in world politics. The paradox underlying the British–Turkish partnership was the absence of a common enemy, since Britain was mainly disturbed by the revisionist policies of Germany, while Turkey was threatened by Italy's aggressive policy over the Mediterranean. In this respect, the article will first discuss how the academic literature explains the essential components of alliance formation in international relations. The second section will discuss in detail how British and Turkish threat perceptions diverged emphasizing the lack of a common rival. The final section will discuss how a bilateral partnership was successfully forged despite the absence of a common rival. Overall, the article argues that Britain and Turkey formed a partnership without a common enemy, as they shared a common fear of abandonment, i.e. the fear of losing an actual or a potential ally to an enemy.
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