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| 1 |
ID:
147601
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| Summary/Abstract |
China’s tough response to North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006 raised expectations in the US, South Korea and Japan that Beijing might align its North Korea policy with the international community. Similar expectations were raised (and unmet) following North Korea’s second nuclear test in 2009, the Cheonan sinking and Yeonpyeong Island shelling in 2010, a third nuclear test in 2013, numerous missile tests and military provocations in 2014–2015, and a fourth nuclear test and long-range missile test in early 2016. Many scholars and policymakers maintain that Beijing’s rationales for supporting Pyongyang are crumbling. This article argues that Chinese traditional worldviews and strategic thought remain motivating concepts for Beijing’s policy on North Korea. China’s norms in its near abroad—beliefs about stability, siege mentality, due deference and Confucian reciprocity—explain phases in Beijing’s policy on North Korea and why the Chinese approach does not change as much as external observers hope or expect.
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| 2 |
ID:
175200
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| Summary/Abstract |
North Korea's missile and nuclear tests conducted unilaterally have put China's North Korea policy under intense internal and external pressures. The dramatic developments since 2018 like the détente of the two Koreas and the unprecedented US–North Korea summits are not to be seen as signs that China has played an effective role through its North Korea policy. Why does North Korea always seem to have the upper hand in its relationship with China despite its obvious unilateral economic dependence on China? How did Sino–North Korean relations evolve into their current contradictory state? What is the nature of their relationship? This article considers these questions by analysing China's North Korea policy over the past three decades, since the end of the Cold War. Current research mainly focuses on analyses of specific periods and the interpretation of specific events. By systemically investigating the policy evolution in the past 30 years, this article argues that the US-centric mentality is the primary variable for informing China's perception and policy towards North Korea after the Cold War.
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| 3 |
ID:
089183
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| 4 |
ID:
149460
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| Summary/Abstract |
As he approaches the end of his presidency, Barack Obama, who successfully handled thaws in US-Myanmar and US-Cuba relations, facilitated the signing of a nuclear deal with Iran and promised to“offer an outstretched hand”to enemy states, made no breakthroughs in North Korea. North Korea policy, rather, entered a deadlock. The North Korean nuclear problem has become“one of the most vexing and persistent problems in US foreign policy post Cold War”. Obama’s long-held strategic patience approach has worsened the situation. There is little chance that Obama will change this policy in the short time left of his presidency, so this paper has attempted a deeper analysis into strategic patience in order to better understand US’North Korea policy and to provide reference for China’s own North Korea policy.
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| 5 |
ID:
108633
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
A second round of bilateral nuclear talks between the United States and North Korea last month "narrowed differences" between the two countries on steps needed to resume multilateral denuclearization negotiations, U.S. Special Representative for North Korea Policy Stephen Bosworth told reporters Oct. 25.
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| 6 |
ID:
189217
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