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ID:
098764
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Modern warfare and the war on terror against mainly non-State actors have obliged States to resort to innovative measures which blur the limits between jus in bello and jus ad bellum and create a legal oxymoron where the same measures constitute international law violations should they be perceived under jus in bello and legitimate means of self-defense should they be seen under the lens of self-defense and jus ad bellum. In order to demonstrate the particular axiom the note will use the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as a factual and normative framework and will put under its kaleidoscope the post-disengagement Israeli measures towards Gaza.
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| 2 |
ID:
089258
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Constructivism is often invoked in calls for a turn toward ethics in the practice of International Relations scholarship. Yet, while constructivists rely on norms and ethical ideas in their explanations of world politics, the theory or approach actually fails spectacularly in providing fundamental notions about what is right or ethical in world politics. In this article I interrogate the paradox that, while constructivists provide a prominent place for morals and ethics in their explanations of world politics, constructivism is agnostic on what those morals and ethics should be. I then inquire into the source of ethics in international relations theory more generally, arguing that the ethical commitments of international relations theories are found in the theories' basic assumptions. Finding a fundamental qualitative difference between constructivism and other international relations theories relative to core assumptions, I discuss what constructivist ethics consists of and I turn inward to reflect on the ramifications of the discussion for personal ethics for a constructivist
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| 3 |
ID:
161310
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| Summary/Abstract |
Legitimacy is a key concept in political science. It has deep normative roots in democratic theory and refers usually to righteous, just, fair, and therefore acceptable rule. However, non-democracies also try to create a following among their citizens. They also engage in justifying their rule through politicization, be it of religion, ethnicity, or ideologies ranging from left-wing communism to right-wing nationalism. Against this backdrop, I pose the question: does it make sense to use the concept of legitimacy for both types of regimes, democracies and autocracies alike? Or, do we overstretch the concept when transplanting it to the non-democratic realm? And, empirically, how can we assess to what degree a non-democracy is viewed as legitimate by its citizens? I aim therefore at defining what legitimacy and legitimation is in autocratic settings; drawing a semantic map of rival concepts like support, trust, and loyalty; and tackling concrete challenges in measuring this elusive concept.
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| 4 |
ID:
163083
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