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| 1 |
ID:
132549
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Ever since the late half of the 1770s, the U.S. Navy's commanding officers have operated around the world and around the clock they do so often under austere conditions, always mindful of the danger posed by enemies and dynamic physical environment. Action-oriented Cos must exercise authority over their sailors and other assigned and attached combat forces in a prompt, sustained, and effective manner. The Navy's Information Dominance Corps and its partners work to ensure that these leaders have to the technological basis they need for today's military operations and warfighting scenarios, as sophisticated state and non-state actors seek to gain control of only the physical realm, but also the increasingly important cyber and electromagnetic (EM) domains. Our capstone technological capability, enabled by battlespace awareness and integrated fires, is what we call Assured Command and Control (C2).
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| 2 |
ID:
112015
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| 3 |
ID:
114842
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| 4 |
ID:
132550
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Chief of Naval operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert has described the U.S. Navy as America' s away team. The sport reference reflects one of the CNO's main tenets: "Operated forwards". The goal is to ensure that our nation's conflicts are conducted in the backyards og our adversaries, not ours. We take the fight to them.
But any sport enthusiast knows about the home-field advantage, the benefits that accrue to the local team when playing in its own environment, which it knows better than the visiting team does. This applies in warfare as well. Taking the fight to the enemy risk giving him the home-field advantage.
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| 5 |
ID:
130301
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| 6 |
ID:
089298
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| 7 |
ID:
130363
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| 8 |
ID:
132537
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| Publication |
2014.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Our Navy's forward presence protects the interconnected global system of trade and reinforces the security of the U.S. economy. Our engagement around the world reassures allies, builds trust with partners and friends, and prevents and deters wars. We are the foundation of the nation's "away game," endowed with operational agility, possessed with innovative resourcefulness, and armed with credible combat power to be used where it matters, when it matters. Sustaining our global primacy requires that we dominate the battlespace on, above, and below the surface of the sea, as well as outer space. However, successfully commanding, controlling, and fighting our forces in these areas requires dominance in the information domain, to include the electromagnetic spectrum and cyberspace.
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| 9 |
ID:
118312
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article frames the highly complex national security challenges of surprise, denial and deception. These ultimate asymmetric threats exploit vulnerabilities, capitalizing on hubris, complacency and self-delusion. Such actions prevent the full and accurate assessment of opponents' capabilities and intentions, and hinder appropriate actions. The long and frequent history of surprise, denial and deception suggest that these are essentially psychological phenomena. They are effective because they challenge and exploit perceptions that fill the gap between what is known and unknown. The authors present decision superiority as the fusion of information dominance and decisive action. Technology and intelligence can enhance decision superiority by ameliorating, but not eliminating, the limits of human perception. Translating knowledge into capabilities and actions requires agile, adaptive processes and open institutional collaboration within the interagency, with global allies and the private sector.
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