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ID:
104333
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2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article argues that the dominant paradigm in studies of British small wars positing a central role of minimum force in doctrinal guidelines for counterinsurgency needs to be even more fundamentally revised than has been argued in recent debates. More specifically, it argues that minimum force is nowhere to be found in British doctrine during the small wars of decolonisation. The need for revision also applies to the way British counterinsurgency is usually sharply contrasted with French counterinsurgency. British doctrine during this period is better understood when placed in its proper historical context. This means comparing it with the other two most significant examples of doctrinal development for small wars of decolonisation - those of France and Portugal. This comparison shows that British counterinsurgency was not uniquely population-centric, and this characteristic cannot, therefore, be the reason for its arguably superior if far from infallible performance. Evidence for these arguments comes primarily from doctrinal sources developed specifically to deal with counterinsurgency, complemented with insights from key military thinkers and archival sources of relevance practices. Some wider implications of this analysis for the relationship between combat experience and doctrinal development as well as for counterinsurgency are identified.
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| 2 |
ID:
146807
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| Contents |
The conventional wisdom holds that Spain took only a limited interest in armored warfare until the European powers that intervened in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-39, Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and the USSR, demonstrated its importance on the battlefield. The author, tapping into the previously ignored professional military literature in Spain, reveals that, to the contrary, officers in the Spanish army early on took a lively interest in armor, an interest fed not only by what they knew of developments elsewhere in Europe but by the possibility of using tanks and other armored vehicles to advantage in Spain’s colonial wars in Morocco. It was not so much lack of interest that retarded Spanish development of armored units as lack of funds. Over the interwar years, upwards of 50 percent of the Spanish military budget was spent on personnel, particularly the army’s bloated officer corps.
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| 3 |
ID:
089340
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
John Mueller suggests that we may be reaching a point at which war, as conventionally defined, ceases or nearly ceases to exist in both its international and civil varieties. He assesses the phenomenon and speculates about what this development, should it definitively materialize, might suggest about the various explanations and theories scholars and analysts have preferred to explain the problem of war.
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