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| 1 |
ID:
099247
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| 2 |
ID:
109542
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| 3 |
ID:
122392
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
On 7 October 2001, the Bush administration launched Operation Enduring
Freedom (OEF) to dislodge al Qaeda forces, neutralize the Taliban in
Afghanistan, and decapitate their respective leadership. President Bush insisted
that the United States was not at war with the Afghan people or with Islam,
and the Afghan civilian population was not identified as the enemy. Therefore,
the Pentagon attempted to minimize civilian casualties. OEF toppled the
Taliban regime, but did not eliminate the Taliban influence in Afghanistan. The
Taliban, although expelled from power, still preserved connections with the
rural Pashtun.
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| 4 |
ID:
091987
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Call it a comedy as some have demonstration elections or a tool of public relations, the fact is that peace in the world hangs by a thin thread, and that thread is a stable,democratic Afghanistan (or at least this is what the US and the West will have us believe).This explains the kind of interest the 20 August 2009 presidential elections engendered in most of the world capitals. However, instead of creating confidence at a global level, the elections have ignited a stream of controversies.
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| 5 |
ID:
127349
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| 6 |
ID:
095966
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| Publication |
2010.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the December 2001 Bonn
Agreement, which established an
interim Afghan government, the
United States and international
community have focused on building Afghan
National Army (ANA) and Afghan National
Police (ANP) forces as the linchpin to security.
While necessary, national security forces have
never been sufficient to establish security in
Afghanistan. This strategy reflects a Western
understanding of the "state," more appropriate
for U.S. efforts in Germany and Japan after
World War II.
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| 7 |
ID:
093126
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| 8 |
ID:
094331
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| 9 |
ID:
095602
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| 10 |
ID:
182832
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the emergence of the Taliban in the national scene of Afghanistan, speculations have abounded around whether to call the movement a Pashtun nationalist movement or should it be termed as a radical Islamic movement having supra ethnic tendencies? It can be viewed that the Taliban movement in Afghanistan neither has its origin directly in the Pashtun tribal culture nor in the tradition of Islam. The leaders of the movement tend to use both these identities voluntarily based on circumstances. Depending on the aims and objectives in a given situation, both these identities are instrumentalized by the Taliban leaders to recruit more fighters and also to carry on with the political aspect of strategic decision making. Moreover, in the post 2001 scenario Afghan Taliban's principal ambition is to fight for national liberation against the presence of foreign forces and their local allies in Afghanistan under the banner of ‘divinely decreed Jihad’.
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| 11 |
ID:
095789
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| 12 |
ID:
097994
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| Publication |
Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008.
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| Description |
xv, 266p.
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| Standard Number |
9780195476002, hbk
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Copies: C:1/I:0,R:0,Q:0
Circulation
| Accession# | Call# | Current Location | Status | Policy | Location |
| 055148 | 954.91/NIC 055148 | Main | On Shelf | General | |
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| 13 |
ID:
115086
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The influence of sectarianism in politics is about as welcome a topic among policymakers as the drunken uncle or the drug addict son is at the family dinner table. Indeed, a strong case can be made that it is because policymakers in powerful countries, above all in the United States and Western Europe, within the UN system, especially in the departments of political affairs and peacekeeping, and at the World Bank and the IMF, tend to craft their strategies and make their decisions as if sectarianism were a minor concern rather than the central one that it has always been in most parts of the world, that, like a sort of Philosopher's Stone in reverse, it has turned so many supposed geostrategic sure things into either disappointments or outright failures.
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| 14 |
ID:
118894
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| 15 |
ID:
102696
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
U.S. STRATEGY toward Pakistan is focused on trying to get Islamabad to give serious help to Washington's campaign against the Afghan Taliban. There are two rather large problems with this approach. The first is that it is never going to happen. As U.S. diplomats in Pakistan themselves recognize (and as was made ever so clear by the WikiLeaks dispatches), both Pakistani strategic calculations and the feelings of the country's population make it impossible for Islamabad to take such a step, except in return for U.S. help against India-which Washington also cannot deliver.
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| 16 |
ID:
103424
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article provides a review of the history of jihadi foreign fighters in Afghanistan over the last 30 years. It details the post-9/11 period and the invasion of Afghanistan by U.S. forces, focusing on the ethnic origin of the foreign fighters and how different groups engaged in different aspects of the conflict. Additionally, the piece explains that while the foreign fighters who came to fight alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan included, among others, Uzbekistanis (not Afghan Uzbeks), Turks, and Arabs, there was also a significant force of Pakistanis-of both Pashtun and Punjabi origins-that joined, bolstering the Taliban army.
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| 17 |
ID:
102111
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| 18 |
ID:
115487
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| 19 |
ID:
118888
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| 20 |
ID:
111280
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Pashtun populations of Afghanistan and Pakistan have long been a source of bilateral contention, with each government inciting Pashtun tribals against the other. Now that the majority of Pashtuns live in Pakistan, Islamabad is using its Pashtun connections to project influence into Afghanistan. As a result, both Afghanistan and Pakistan are threatened by runaway Pashtun militancy. Peace and stability in both countries will be impossible until political reforms have been implemented in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan. Reforms, with international support, would undermine radical networks and could be leveraged to improve Afghanistan-Pakistan relations.
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