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| 1 |
ID:
138502
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper suggests that we may learn much about mainstream doctrines and practices of governance from watching what happens when they engage with international development issues. Cambodia is an illuminating example. Despite apparent material, organizational and intellectual superiority, Western engagement with poor countries often fails: Cambodia points us towards possible explanations as to why. The paper suggests that the lack of success in development intervention has had much to do with patterns visible in Western policy and governance doctrines: a desire to base the organization of interventions on cause–effect principles; an associated reckless application of imagined generic cause–effect relationships with little robust empirical foundation; and associated tendencies towards sectarianism.
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| 2 |
ID:
089517
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
During the 1990s, skeptical aid donors confronted an example of development "success" in Vietnam. Understanding this requires reflection upon economic conditions in North Vietnam prior to 1975. These conditions created important prerequisites for a successful transition to a market economy, sufficiently guided by local reformists so as not to unduly threaten stability, and sufficiently reflective of realities that it could work
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| 3 |
ID:
165346
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| Summary/Abstract |
In power, the Vietnamese Communist Party has experienced three ‘moments’ of growth, each with some differences of detail and of meanings: ‘traditional communism’; the transition from a planned to a market economy in the 1980s; and, since 1992, a ‘socialist-oriented market economy’. For each, the article discusses the ideologically defined nature of change; intentionality—‘how growth was to happen’; and the quantitative data used. It suggests that critiques throughout the period have engaged with the intentionality issue: in the first moment, by isolating the socialist relations of production within socialist construction as the cause of difficulties; more recently, by engaging with the lack of effective policy despite contemporary ideology's unreliable belief in policy as key to growth.
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| 4 |
ID:
178110
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| Summary/Abstract |
The article presents a history of the policy of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) towards state owned enterprises (SOEs). Despite an evident embrace of markets from the early 1990s, the VCP has resisted formal political change. The state sector has retained a privileged economic and political position. Policy has been made in the context of a political order where the interests of certain groups within the ostensibly hierarchical state have usually prevailed over attempts to generate coherent economic strategy. This has resulted in a situation where the formal ownership of SOEs is unclear, and real ownership is vested, apparently, in groups within a State Business Interest.
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| 5 |
ID:
113919
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Tensions in the international arena are linked here to problems in contemporary Vietnam. Eroding domestic political authority is related to the lack of political reconstruction to suit a market economy and an increasingly open society. At the close of 2011, it appears that there is as yet no clear path forward.
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| 6 |
ID:
119095
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paper reviews political and other trajectories in Vietnam in 2012, concluding that a systemic political crisis continues. Trying to rule over an increasingly open and globalizing society with unreformed Communist political institutions, the Vietnamese Communist Party has seen its institutional authority evaporate, so that it no longer functions as a coherent source of sovereign power.
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