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| 1 |
ID:
087727
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The "Americanization" of the global drug war is now synonymous with the global expansion of the United States (U.S.) Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) drug enforcement operations in foreign countries. Recent research posits that the rise in violent crime in Latin America is the "collateral damage" of the "Americanization" of drug enforcement in the region. However, the causal inference of the "collateral damage" thesis is biased because drug enforcement and violent crime in Latin America are endogenously related. This research corrects this bias in two ways. First, we collect data for cases to which the endogenous bias does not apply. Namely, we ask what effect does the operations of the DEA, specifically trafficker immobilization and drug interdiction, have on violent and property crimes in Central American and Caribbean countries where drug producing cartels and narco-insurgent organizations are not indigenous to the political landscape? Second, we estimate the data via a structural equation model. The results lend support to the collateral damage hypothesis. The DEA's coordinated drug enforcement operations contribute to increasing the level of violent and property crimes in the region.
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| 2 |
ID:
087706
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The "Americanization" of the global drug war is now synonymous with the global expansion of the United States (U.S.) Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) drug enforcement operations in foreign countries. Recent research posits that the rise in violent crime in Latin America is the "collateral damage" of the "Americanization" of drug enforcement in the region. However, the causal inference of the "collateral damage" thesis is biased because drug enforcement and violent crime in Latin America are endogenously related. This research corrects this bias in two ways. First, we collect data for cases to which the endogenous bias does not apply. Namely, we ask what effect does the operations of the DEA, specifically trafficker immobilization and drug interdiction, have on violent and property crimes in Central American and Caribbean countries where drug producing cartels and narco-insurgent organizations are not indigenous to the political landscape? Second, we estimate the data via a structural equation model. The results lend support to the collateral damage hypothesis. The DEA's coordinated drug enforcement operations contribute to increasing the level of violent and property crimes in the region.
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| 3 |
ID:
087710
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Empirical evidence supports the poliheuristic (PH) theory of decision making, which states that leaders typically employ a two-stage non-compensatory decision-making process. In stage one leaders reject options that do not meet some minimum criteria of acceptability on one or more dimensions, and in stage two they choose among the remaining options using a more rational utility-maximizing rule. While PH theory has primarily been applied at the monadic level, to explain the process and content of states' decisions, we contend it has important implications for strategic interaction and can help to explain outcomes in world politics. Specifically, we argue that a crucial variable shaping crisis outcomes is the degree to which leaders' non compensatory decision criteria in stage one include options' acceptability to the opponent. When leaders empathize with their opponent and screen out those options the opponent considers unacceptable, crises will be resolved more quickly and with a lower likelihood of escalation. Empathy introduced during the second, utility-maximizing stage, may also dampen conflict but is less effective than stage one empathy. We illustrate this dyadic non compensatory model by examining two cases involving the U.S.-China and U.S.-Iraq bilateral relationships.
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| 4 |
ID:
087730
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Empirical evidence supports the poliheuristic (PH) theory of decision making, which states that leaders typically employ a two-stage non-compensatory decision-making process. In stage one leaders reject options that do not meet some minimum criteria of acceptability on one or more dimensions, and in stage two they choose among the remaining options using a more rational utility-maximizing rule. While PH theory has primarily been applied at the monadic level, to explain the process and content of states' decisions, we contend it has important implications for strategic interaction and can help to explain outcomes in world politics. Specifically, we argue that a crucial variable shaping crisis outcomes is the degree to which leaders' non compensatory decision criteria in stage one include options' acceptability to the opponent. When leaders empathize with their opponent and screen out those options the opponent considers unacceptable, crises will be resolved more quickly and with a lower likelihood of escalation. Empathy introduced during the second, utility-maximizing stage, may also dampen conflict but is less effective than stage one empathy. We illustrate this dyadic non compensatory model by examining two cases involving the U.S.-China and U.S.-Iraq bilateral relationships.
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| 5 |
ID:
087731
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2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paper aims to shed light on the conceptual link between international crises such as the one following September 11, 2001, and processes of identity construction through foreign policy. Crisis and identity construction are conceptualized as constant political phenomena. The political process is constituted by meaningful acts of social agents, and can thus only be grasped by analyzing meaning. Meaning is transmitted by language. Meaningful language is never reducible to individual speakers; it is a social act. The sum of articulatory practices in a social field is called discourse. Linking Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) with the theory of hegemony developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, I will be able to show how hegemonic discourses serve as the nexus between the discursive construction of crises and identity change. A number of problems will be acknowledged when linking these two strands of thinking, as CDA and Laclauian theory work with tentatively different conceptions of discourse. The construction of the "war on terror" by the Bush administration between September 2001 and May 2003 is used as a case to illustrate the theoretical argument.
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| 6 |
ID:
087711
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The paper aims to shed light on the conceptual link between international crises such as the one following September 11, 2001, and processes of identity construction through foreign policy. Crisis and identity construction are conceptualized as constant political phenomena. The political process is constituted by meaningful acts of social agents, and can thus only be grasped by analyzing meaning. Meaning is transmitted by language. Meaningful language is never reducible to individual speakers; it is a social act. The sum of articulatory practices in a social field is called discourse. Linking Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) with the theory of hegemony developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, I will be able to show how hegemonic discourses serve as the nexus between the discursive construction of crises and identity change. A number of problems will be acknowledged when linking these two strands of thinking, as CDA and Laclauian theory work with tentatively different conceptions of discourse. The construction of the "war on terror" by the Bush administration between September 2001 and May 2003 is used as a case to illustrate the theoretical argument.
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| 7 |
ID:
087707
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The survival of governments ultimately depends on the survival of its components. These components are politicians whose goal is to stay in office. There has been extensive research on the survival of leaders, but not on the survival of other politicians in government; and even less on how the survival of one affects the survival of the others. The purpose of this article is to take the first step in this direction by analyzing and precisely measuring the impact of the tenure of leaders on the tenure of foreign ministers. This article provides a systematic and formal investigation of the variables that affect the duration in office of foreign ministers. The investigation is based on a new data base on the tenure of more than 7,500 foreign ministers spanning three centuries. Although evidence shows that political institutions have significant impact on the tenure of foreign ministers, internal coalition dynamics such as affinity and loyalty toward a leader, uncertainty, and time dependence are better predictors of their political survival.
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| 8 |
ID:
087728
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The survival of governments ultimately depends on the survival of its components. These components are politicians whose goal is to stay in office. There has been extensive research on the survival of leaders, but not on the survival of other politicians in government; and even less on how the survival of one affects the survival of the others. The purpose of this article is to take the first step in this direction by analyzing and precisely measuring the impact of the tenure of leaders on the tenure of foreign ministers. This article provides a systematic and formal investigation of the variables that affect the duration in office of foreign ministers. The investigation is based on a new data base on the tenure of more than 7,500 foreign ministers spanning three centuries. Although evidence shows that political institutions have significant impact on the tenure of foreign ministers, internal coalition dynamics such as affinity and loyalty toward a leader, uncertainty, and time dependence are better predictors of their political survival.
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| 9 |
ID:
087729
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper elaborates a model of problem representation first presented by Billings and Hermann (1998). The foreign policy process begins when decision-makers specify policy goals and identify relevant constraints in response to a perceived problem. Although this initial problem representation often sets the course for subsequent policy, unanticipated constraints can arise that catch decision makers off-guard. Finding themselves in a context they did not anticipate to be in, decision makers may choose to alter their representation of the problem and/or change the course of policy. Billings and Hermann offer one piece of this puzzle by examining how decision makers re-represent problems; this paper provides the second piece by assessing how policies, not representations, change in response to new constraints. A case study of the U.S. response to the Ethiopian famine in the mid 1980s demonstrates that policy does not always follow problem representation.
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| 10 |
ID:
087708
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| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
This paper elaborates a model of problem representation first presented by Billings and Hermann (1998). The foreign policy process begins when decision-makers specify policy goals and identify relevant constraints in response to a perceived problem. Although this initial problem representation often sets the course for subsequent policy, unanticipated constraints can arise that catch decision makers off-guard. Finding themselves in a context they did not anticipate to be in, decision makers may choose to alter their representation of the problem and/or change the course of policy. Billings and Hermann offer one piece of this puzzle by examining how decision makers re-represent problems; this paper provides the second piece by assessing how policies, not representations, change in response to new constraints. A case study of the U.S. response to the Ethiopian famine in the mid 1980s demonstrates that policy does not always follow problem representation.
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