| Publication |
2009.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The difficulty of satisfying competing needs of both national and sub-national officials and commanders for intelligence support capabilities that are too sensitive and expensive to duplicate for both sets of requirements emerged with the growth of industrial-scale imagery and signals intelligence assets and production during the Cold War. The literature of intelligence history and intelligence studies covers the symptoms of this problem, but says less a rigorous and well-documented nature on its causes. Thanks to recent declassifications in the United States, however, we can now read key documents in an American attempt to understand and deal with the dilemma. A study prepared for President Richard Nixon in 1971 and now dubbed the 'Schlesinger Report' has been published virtually intact by the US Department of State. In addition, the Central Intelligence Agency has released two official histories which indirectly have added significant detail to the story. With these new releases, it is now possible to explain the genesis of the Report and chart its effects through the remainder of President Nixon's presidency. The Schlesinger Report marked a watershed for the intelligence community, helping the Nixon Administration to conceive and enact reforms that were both consequential in themselves and presaged the findings of later surveys and inquiries. A better understanding of the Report's background, text, and results can shed light not only the policymaking process in the Nixon Administration but also the trajectory of the intelligence community - and of foreign intelligence establishments that may, in some respects, be following in its path.
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