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| 1 |
ID:
183445
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| Summary/Abstract |
Since the 1990s, many publications in the world have predicted the "imminent collapse of the North Korean regime" or a change of power in the country. However, so far this has not happened, and the DPRK continues to exist in its former form. What leads to such chronically unrealizable predictions about North Korea, and what are the alternatives for the future of this country in the short and medium term?
Based on a number of recent unfulfilled predictions, the authors try to explain the reason for these failures, closely related to ideological framework, lack of information, and dependence on certain sources, which leads to underestimation of the DPRK's capabilities and misinterpretation of data, when any event is seen as a sign of the regime's imminent collapse. Based on the theoretical approaches of Gordon Tullock and Vladimir Lenin, the article identifies the main types of modern threats to the current political regime (external invasion, coup within the elite, economic collapse, mass protests), as well as the probability of their implementation under the current policy of the DPRK leadership.
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| 2 |
ID:
116032
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| 3 |
ID:
124587
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Purpose-The purpose of this article is to examine China's policy toward North Korea under the Xi Jinping leadership from 2012 to the present.
Design/methodology/approach-It is designed to analyze China's changing attitudes and policy toward North Korea in the post-Kim Jong-Il era with emphasis on the analysis of the Xi Jinping leadership's policy toward the Kim Jong-Un regime. The approach is qualitative and expository, utilizing Chinese, Japanese, Korean and English source materials.
Findings-Unlike its predecessor, which regarded the prevention of the collapse of the North Korean regime as the top priority of China's Korea policy, the Xi Jinping leadership regards the preservation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as the top priority of its Korea policy, for the outbreak of a war on the Korean Peninsula could seriously undermine China's security interest by embroiling it in an unwanted war. Unlike its predecessors, the Xi leadership is serious about the elimination of North Korea's nuclear weapons program.
Originality/value-The value of the article lies in its explanation for the change in the priority of China's policy from the survival of the North Korean regime to the preservation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. In addition, it helps to explain why China under the Xi Jinping leadership has become not only more serious about opposing Pyongyang's nuclear weapons program but also more cooperative with the U.S. and other powers for the denuclearization of North Korea.
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| 4 |
ID:
169959
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| Summary/Abstract |
A widely-held perception is that the image of North Korea among most Chinese people has changed from that of a socialist comrade and ‘little brother’ to an idiosyncratic, trouble-making neighbor. This research questions the homogeneity of Chinese people’s viewpoints towards North Korea. Concepts of state and popular nationalism are used to examine differences and similarities between the Chinese state and its people in their perceptions and sentiments towards North Korea, mainly focusing on the period of succession from Kim Jong-il to Kim Jong-un. Examining online discussions representing Chinese popular nationalism demonstrated that Chinese netizens’ political viewpoints are diversified along the ideological spectrum of left and right and that only the ‘moderate left’ netizens hold an image of North Korea which is close to that of their political authorities.
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| 5 |
ID:
160672
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| Summary/Abstract |
North Korea's engagement in the Middle East is a six-decade long narrative. Neither the DPRK nor its Middle Eastern partners have remained still over this time; each region has undergone significant changes. In particular, the leadership of the North Korea is now in the hands of the third generation. No matter how stagnant and monolithic the country may seem at first sight, each generation has had to deal with differing commitments and adapt to changing realities. As such, each generational change of leadership in Pyongyang has arguably had repercussions on the DPRK's relationship Middle Eastern partners, which may at times have been misattributed to a fundamental change of approach. This study attempts, therefore, to probe the twists and turns in the DPRK's interactions with the Middle East since the death of Kim Il-sung, beginning with an appraisal of each leaderships’ priorities in North Korea, and how they could potentially influence Pyongyang's overall orientation toward its different partners in the region.
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| 6 |
ID:
117662
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| 7 |
ID:
177040
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| Summary/Abstract |
One of the most challenging tasks for a deterrence planner is assessing a leader's intent, which requires having an in-depth level of subject-matter expertise. This article investigates this challenge and offers answers to the following question “how can we identify a leader’s intent” to aid deterrence planners, operators, and policymakers? To examine this question, we used a multi-method approach by performing several qualitative analyses on Kim Jong-Un’s New Year’s Eve speeches (2013–2018). We focused on techniques that assessed the underlying facets of intent (e.g. cognitive beliefs and goals). These speeches served as a viable secondary source that identified objective markers to which we applied a coding scheme to extract the adversary’s “intent” to perform a particular action. This article argues that identifying intent can help policy-makers and planners understand if an adversary has plans to perform specific operations.
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| 8 |
ID:
129021
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| 9 |
ID:
160908
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| Summary/Abstract |
By talking directly with Kim Jong-un, Donald Trump did achieve something unprecedented, but it was all in Kim’s favour.
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| 10 |
ID:
141490
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| Summary/Abstract |
The Republic of Korea and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea since 1972 have attempted reconciliation, but without durable success. The latter’s building of a nuclear arsenal erased the progress achieved in 1989–1992 and 1998–2008. Assessed here is whether the new leaders of both Koreas since 2012 might be able to resume progress toward reconciliation. Ultimately, Park alone cannot sustain progress toward reconciliation unless she receives substantial domestic political support and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un responds constructively to her effort.
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| 11 |
ID:
115064
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The death of Kim Jong-il and subsequent dynastic transfer of power in North Korea caused a spasm of hope in the policy community that the secretive and totalitarian nation might embark on economic and political reforms. As the new leader, Kim Jong-un, was exposed to Western affluence while receiving his education in Switzerland-so the wishful thinking goes-surely he would realize the benefits of opening up his country. In fact, the young and inexperienced scion of the Kim dynasty derives his legitimacy solely from his family heritage. He has every reason to perpetuate the oppressive system built by his grandfather and buttressed by his father. In fact, how much Kim Jong-un's ideas and beliefs matter will remain questionable, at least over the short term. It is reasonable to assume that the untested leader will be guided by guardians or perhaps regents. This means that he may not be the one calling the shots, at least for the time being. The opaqueness of the power structure, meanwhile, has important implications for the outside world. The consolidation of power is likely to be still in progress, and it would take months-possibly even longer-for outside observers to learn how policies are determined. With Kim Jong-il, the world at least knew with whom it was dealing. Under Kim Jong-un, we may not even enjoy that advantage for some time to come.
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| 12 |
ID:
149853
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| Summary/Abstract |
Organisational changes to North Korea's intelligence and security services in 2016 have strengthened and consolidated Kim Jong-un's position. Joseph S Bermudez surveys the changes and what they mean for domestic threats or challenges to Kim.
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| 13 |
ID:
121149
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| 14 |
ID:
129111
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| 15 |
ID:
103622
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| Publication |
2011.
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| Summary/Abstract |
The North killed 50 South Koreans in two audacious strikes, revved up its nuclear programs, and prepared for a third generation of Kim family rule. At the same time, a tight embrace of China still means hardship and hunger for millions of North Koreans.
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| 16 |
ID:
113908
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| Publication |
2012.
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| Summary/Abstract |
North Korea underwent a seemingly seamless leadership transition from father to son in the midst of a struggling economy and widespread hunger. The North drew even closer to China but also reached out to the United States and Russia for the first time in several years. Meanwhile, inter-Korean relations remained in a deep freeze.
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| 17 |
ID:
164945
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| Summary/Abstract |
Kim Jong-un showcased a series of summit meetings throughout 2018, including the first-ever meeting of a North Korean leader with a sitting US president. North Korea improved its strained relations with China and South Korea. The country’s denuclearization has yet to be seen, but these events sparked considerable debate about the future.
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| 18 |
ID:
178805
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| Summary/Abstract |
This article explores the evolution of the DPRK’s ideology and propaganda
and the channels of their transmission during Kim Jong-un’s rule. The
authors highlight several distinguishing features/markers of new trends in
the DPRK’s current ideology and propaganda.
The study indicates that the demand for change is related with both
changes in Kim Jong-un’s governance style and the current realities, such
as North Koreans’ growing knowledge about the outside world and external
information pressures.
The most significant trends in North Korea’s ideology today are: departure
from the term sŏngun; the use of the umbrella term ‘ideas of Kim Il-sung-Kim
Jong-Il’; lower level of Kim Jong-un’s personality cult in contrast to that
of the previous two leaders; an attempt to delineate a watershed between
purely metaphorical descriptions and qualities of the leaders and their real
abilities; growing attention to domestic problems and greater openness in
the discussion of pressing issues; new methods of propaganda (including
social networks) addressed to the foreign audience.
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| 19 |
ID:
154997
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| 20 |
ID:
124582
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| Publication |
2013.
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| Summary/Abstract |
Purpose-This article describes and analyzes the DPRK's cultural diplomacy during the early months of Kim Jong-un's reign.
Methodology-We analyze the recent practice of North Korea's cultural diplomacy, using two case studies: the KCNA-Associated Press photo exhibition in New York, and the tour of the Unhasu Orchestra to Paris.
Findings-Both initiatives coincided with the first months of Kim Jong-un's reign, and can provide an alternate perspective on both North Korean foreign policy and the wider debate about how to best engage the DPRK.
Originality/value-The article thus adds to the literature on North Korean foreign relations as well as cultural diplomacy more generally.
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